Beyond aid: The continuous struggle to cope with displacement in Myanmar and Thailand by Rudolf, Markus & Schmitz-Pranghe, Clara
www.ssoar.info
Beyond aid: The continuous struggle to cope with
displacement in Myanmar and Thailand
Rudolf, Markus; Schmitz-Pranghe, Clara
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rudolf, M., & Schmitz-Pranghe, C. (2018). Beyond aid: The continuous struggle to cope with displacement in Myanmar
and Thailand. (BICC Working Paper, 1/2018). Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-61454-3
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0
\ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2018
 \ WORKING PAPER
Beyond aid: The continuous struggle 
to cope with displacement 
in Myanmar and Thailand
Markus Rudolf \ BICC
Clara Schmitz-Pranghe \ BICC 
1\ 2018 
 
\ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2018
SUMMARY
THE STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH DISPLACEMENT IN MYANMAR AND THAILAND \ M. RUDOLF & C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE
Multi-party elections and the signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
(NCA) in 2015 raised hopes in the international community of a possible set-
tlement of Myanmar’s protracted conflict and one of the world’s worst pro-
tracted displacement situations (PDS) in the near future. Yet conflicts in the 
border areas and human rights abuses carry on, more than 600,000 Burmese 
continue to be displaced within Myanmar and three to five million remain in 
Thailand. This Working Paper examines strategies that displaced persons from 
Myanmar have developed striving to cope with major challenges of displace-
ment. We observed that strategies go beyond the commonly used three durable 
solutions. The findings suggest that neither return nor local integration into 
the society of the host country is necessarily definite or are mutually exclusive. 
Both are merely two poles of a wide range of displaced persons’ possible coping 
strategies, encompassing return, cyclical movements, temporary return, de jure 
local integration and different levels and stages of de facto local integration.   
 
In scrutinizing whether the change of governance eradicated the causes of 
displacement, brought peace and laid the foundation for return, our research 
revealed significant flaws in Myanmar’s political transition. Notwithstanding 
impressive achievements, conflicts persist and are likely to cause new waves 
of displacement. With regard to access to legal, economic, political rights, ser-
vices, house, land, property and livelihoods, the situation of displaced persons 
(DPs) remains dire. Still, the international community promotes return and 
has been reducing assistance for camps in and outside of Myanmar. For inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, this means that options of refuge 
have diminished, while the causes to flee remain. After decades of displacement, 
DPs have developed a set of practices such as diversifications of livelihoods, in-
come sources, residences, and others. We argue that it is imperative for any 
long-term and coherent strategy that addresses protracted displacement to 
take those micro realities into account. 
2 \ 
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Varying prospects for DPs’ local 
integration
The prospects for displaced persons’ local integra-
tion vary according to the quality of ties with the  
local population (common language, ethnic back-
ground) and how they secure their livelihoods. Deci-
sive factors are also the social, legal and political  
status of DPs and the ensuing level of access to pro-
tection, free movement, work permits, infrastructure, 
and the labour demand in the receiving 
communities. 
De facto local integration is an adaption 
mechanisms of everyday life
The lack of de jure local integration regarding  
citizenship, residence and work rights observed in 
Thailand contrasts starkly with the everyday life  
situation of DPs. A large number of displaced persons 
from Myanmar have achieved a de facto local integra-
tion outside the country in urban and rural areas.  
As the Burmese labour force is indispensable for  
Thailand's economy, Burmese employees and Thai 
employers would benefit from the extension of labour 
rights for Burmese.
Legal categories do not suffice to 
address social realities
In the Thai‒Burmese context, refugees, IDPs, re-
turnees and migrants cannot be categorically differ-
entiated. Categories are either officially not used, 
overlap or change over time. Solution strategies for 
protracted displacement situations, therefore, need to 
be derived from a conceptually widened analysis of 
forced migration as an act of involuntary movement.
DPs regard prospects for return dire
Return does not seem to be feasible for many ref-
ugees and IDPs, despite certain progress with regard 
to democratization and ceasefires in Myanmar.  
Obstacles to the return of refugees and IDPs are 
foremost security concerns, distrust in authorities, 
low confidence in ceasefire negotiations and limited 
access to land, documents, legal representation, hous-
ing, healthcare, education or livelihoods.
DPs have developed a variety of  
coping mechanisms  
The primary coping mechanisms of DPs are a  
diversification of livelihoods; modification of  
socio-economic units (e.g. family split-ups); multiple 
residencies; semi-autonomous infrastructure (health, 
education, administration); temporary, cyclical or 
partial return; expansion of translocal networks as 
well as a reliance on material and immaterial aid  
(e.g. camps, projects, funds). Identifying and support-
ing existing strategies beyond aid would be an impor-
tant prerequisite to fostering forms of sustainable 
livelihoods. 
Main findings
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pays attention to both the high mobility of the people 
concerned and to existing or persisting translocal 
networks. We argue that a better understanding of 
the nature of protracted displacement and the strate-
gies used by the people concerned is a prerequisite for 
adapted, participative, coherent and sustainable 
strategies of humanitarian and development aid—
and in fact for any conceptualization of durable solu-
tions for PDS.3 
 Conceptual framework 
In its conceptualization of solutions to protracted 
displacement, this Paper goes beyond the classical un-
derstanding of durable solutions—return, local inte-
gration and resettlement. Those concepts were found 
to be of relevance as a political and normative dis-
course but not as descriptive labels that match the  
reality on the ground.4 Displaced persons have devel-
oped alternative strategies to secure their lives and 
livelihoods, i.e. in accessing the political, social, eco-
nomic, legal and cultural life of the destination coun-
try to a varying degree or by combining classical solu-
tions. We thus distinguish two concepts of local 
integration: A normative and fully legalized de jure  
local integration as defined in international conven-
tions and a somewhat informal, limited everyday 
practice, henceforth called de facto local integration. 
Despite the fact that it has been advocated for since 
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, de jure local integra-
tion, which primarily refers to the naturalization, i.e. 
3 \  The Working Paper is based on findings of a research conducted in various 
locations in Thailand and Myanmar between July 2016 and February 
2018 in the framework of the BMZ funded project “Protected rather 
than Protracted: Strengthening Refugees and Peace”. The project  
addresses persons affected by displacement, government agencies,  
stakeholders from international and non-governmental organizations.
4 \  In Thailand de jure local integration is out of reach for the majority of 
displaced persons. The country is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Con-
vention on Refugees or its companion 1967 protocol and lacks a formal 
national asylum framework. Asylum seekers are technically designated 
as illegal immigrants, but they are allowed to stay in nine officially 
called “temporary shelters” along the Thai‒Burmese border. Prospects 
for resettlement have considerably deteriorated for Burmese refugees 
since group resettlement programmes were closed down in 2014. UNHCR 
organized a pilot return programme in 2016 assisting 72 refugees to 
return to Myanmar. However, it remains to be seen whether condi-
tions in Myanmar—especially with regard to persisting conflict and 
poor livelihood opportunities—allow for sustainable return and  
encourage large-scale voluntary return of internally displaced people 
and refugees in the near future.
For the last decades, both Myanmar and Thailand 
have been affected by one of the longest-lasting and 
biggest protracted displacement situations in East 
Asia: More than 600,000 Burmese are displaced with-
in and three to five million outside of Myanmar—
most of whom live in Thailand. Armed conflicts in 
the border areas, state repression and human rights 
abuses have forced hundreds of thousands of Burmese—
especially of ethnic minorities—to flee. Multi-party 
general elections and the signing of the Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with eight of the armed 
ethnic actors in 2015 raised hopes in the international 
community of a possible settlement of Myanmar’s 
protracted conflict and one of the world’s worst pro-
tracted displacement situations (PDS) in the near fu-
ture. International policy changed accordingly:  
International sanctions were lifted, and increased  
cooperation and development assistance were granted, 
based on the hope that the problem of displacement 
would cease to exist as affected persons would return. 
This idea, in turn, was based on the assumption that 
the root causes of displacement were in the process 
of being resolved. The central question of this Working 
Paper is to assess whether or not this view corresponds 
to the facts on the ground. 
In contrast to many publications that address a 
macro‒political level of displacement, this Paper  
assesses this topic foremost by examining displace-
ment, perspectives and resulting strategies of affected 
people from Myanmar1 within the country and in 
Thailand.2 It analyzes the hardships and coping strat-
egies of displaced persons and contributes to the  
debate on solutions to protracted displacement situa-
tions (PDS) by focusing on perspectives and agency of 
the displaced persons. Our transnational approach 
1 \  In 1989, the former military junta changed the country’s name from 
Burma to Myanmar. This study uses the term ‘Myanmar’ acknowledging 
that most people of the country use this term. It is, however, recognized 
that the name is controversial and for many emblematizes autocratic 
rule and severe human rights abuses. The term “Burmese” which in 
some  conflict-affected communities is used to refer to the ethnic 
group of the Bamar or the the Burmese military refers to all citizens of 
Myanmar in this Paper, while the term “Bamar” is used for the major 
ethnic group.
2 \  As this Paper is addressed to a non-specialized public, a wide array of 
information is covered which necessarily affects the depth of analysis. 
We tried our best to counter this fallacy by including references to 
quality papers that explore the respective issues in depth throughout 
the text. 
Introduction
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internal displacement. Acknowledging that the rela-
tionship to the receiving community is a decisive factor 
for local integration and reintegration, our research 
took into account not only the displaced themselves 
but also the local communities. We understand  
displacement and return as a process that is often not 
linear but interrupted and sometimes characterized 
by cyclical movements and multiple displacements. 
This conceptualization is based on earlier studies that 
showed that static categorizations that differentiate 
between IDPs, refugees and (illegal) migrants do not 
match the reality on the ground (Richmond, 1994; van 
Hear, 1998). 
In this Paper, we use the term ‘coping strategies’ 
to refer to adaption mechanisms individuals use to 
lessen the adverse effects of stress or to reduce their 
vulnerability (cf. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). We under-
stand resilience as the ability to re-establish such 
adaption mechanisms after the shock of a human- 
made or natural disaster. We do not argue that resil-
ience is equivalent to an automatism of bouncing 
back after such disasters. We rather want to highlight 
opportunities to break vicious circles by building 
upon existing capacities (Lenette, Brough & Cox, 2013; 
Omata, 2012; Sousa, Haj-Yahia, Feldman & Lee, 2013). 
We recognize that not all persons are in a condition to 
exit those vicious circles without external help. We 
observed that, in fact, a majority of affected persons do 
not manage to re-establish their status quo before dis-
placement. Nevertheless, we also observed a remarkable 
resilience among DPs and hosts that proves wrong 
any ideas about victims being deprived of all capacities 
and, ultimately, any agency.
Displacement dynamics
For the last decades, Myanmar and Thailand have 
been affected by one of the most long-lasting and big-
gest protracted displacement situations in East Asia. 
Large-scale internal displacement and cross-border 
movements in search for protection and survival  
already began when civil war erupted following inde-
pendence in the late 1940s.8  However, while 
8 \  For background information on Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups and 
conflict dynamics see for example Duffield, 2008; Smith, 1999;  
Buchanan, 2016; Lintner, 1999.
the granting of citizenship to refugees, is rare. De facto 
local integration, in contrast, is a gradual process and 
an everyday practice of (forced) migrants. Due to miss-
ing residence or work permits, displaced persons in 
informal circumstances are highly vulnerable. They 
are excluded from the protection rights that they 
would enjoy as official refugees (Hovil, 2014). 
Even though de facto local integration is an every-
day practice of displaced persons around the globe, it 
has mostly been ignored by policymakers and is hardly 
researched by academics. In part, this has been due to 
policy preferences for encampment, which, in turn, 
have been related to logistical considerations and in-
ternal politics of the respective host countries (Bohnet, 
2016; Bohnet, Mielke, Rudolf, Schetter, & Vollmer, 2015). 
Other reasons for this negligence have been difficul-
ties in accessing and measuring de facto local integra-
tion due to its informal character. After years of disre-
gard, there is now a growing academic interest in de 
facto local integration, especially in the context of urban 
refugees.5 UNHCR started to focus on urban refugees 
and elaborated a “Policy on Alternatives to Camps” in 
2014. Also, development cooperation increasingly rec-
ognized the needs of urban, often not registered, refu-
gees and other displaced persons living outside of 
camps.6  
In this Working Paper, we define a displaced person 
as someone who at a point in time has felt or feels 
compelled to leave their place of residence involuntarily.7 
With this definition, we neither adhere to the legally 
motivated differentiation between refugees and  
migrants and undocumented migrants nor exclude 
 
5 \  See Refugee Law Project working paper series; Jacobsen and Landau, 2003; 
Briant and Kennedy, 2004.
6 \  In the Thai context, there are several studies on Burmese labour mi-
gration and Thai migration policies (Chantavanich & Vungsiriphisal, 
2012), on migrant education (Lee, 2012), on humanitarian assistance for 
displaced persons from Myanmar (Vungsiriphisal et al., 2014), on tem-
porary shelters and their interaction with and impact on surrounding 
communities and the environment (Chalamwong, Thabchumpon, & 
Chantavanich, 2014; Thadaniti & Chantavanich, 2014), on resettlement 
(Harkins & Chantavanich, 2014) and finally on return (Chantavanich & 
Kamonpetch, 2017b). Little effort has been made so far to connect these 
fields. We propose to close that gap by overcoming a strictly categorical 
differentiation between refugees, labour migrants, irregular migrants 
and internally displaced persons and by analyzing challenges and  
coping strategies of displaced persons from a transnational perspective.
7 \  For definitions, see https://www.bicc.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Projek-
te/1030/1030_methodology_paper.pdf.
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3) those who have faced political repressions.11  This 
Paper focuses primarily on the first group of people. 
Extending the model of Cernea (2000) and Kälin and 
Schrepfer (2012), we differentiate the impact of dis-
placement with respect to access to housing, land 
and property (HLP), to basic services (nutrition/ 
health/ education), and to integration (social/ eco-
nomic/ political/ legal).12 
In Myanmar and Thailand, we looked into these 
dimensions for IDPs and refugees in camps, for con-
fined and immobilized communities and for unregis-
tered urban and rural IDPs and refugees (including 
those who were relocated). 
IDPs are grouped in two different types of camps: 
Those under the realm of the central state and those 
in territories controlled by ethnic armed groups 
(EAGs). The largest—and by now most prominent—
camps controlled by the Tatmadaw are the camps for 
Rohingya in Rakhine State. They are isolated, guarded 
and surrounded by the military that controls all 
movements. The sizes vary, locations are sometimes 
merely a few hundred metres away from the original 
settlements, and often it is virtually impossible to 
distinguish original Rohingya settlements from newly 
built camps. The population inside the camps has 
been virtually cut off from economic, social, cultural 
and political life and most State services (like education 
or health facilities) in Myanmar. The situation inside 
those confined areas was harsh in 2016, but it even 
deteriorated in 2017 during the targeted ethnic 
cleansing. 
Besides the now well-known Rohingya, the  
case of numerous other displaced individuals inside 
Myanmar is less prominent. There are, for example, 
various immobilized IDPs in the eastern border areas. 
11 \  Political dissidents and students fled the country especially in the 
course of massive political repression, which culminated in the crack-
down of the democracy movement in 1988. Many of those who survived 
the crackdown fled imprisonment and torture across the Thai‒Myanmar 
border (Betts & Loescher, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 2008). Since the  
political opening of the country, some of these refugees have returned, 
while others decided to remain abroad or are still blacklisted by the 
regime and hence not able to return (interview with political activist 
in Mae Sot, July 2016). Meanwhile, human rights violations and severe 
restrictions to the freedom of the press in Myanmar continue.
12 \  Cf our methodology paper at https://www.bicc.de/fileadmin/Dateien/
Projekte/1030/1030_methodology_paper.pdf
displacement had been mostly temporary until the 
early 1980s, it became increasingly permanent and 
protracted in the course of the conflict: With the im-
plementation of the four-cuts strategy, aimed at cut-
ting off ethnic armed actors from their support base 
(food, funds, intelligence and popular support) and 
the permanent establishment of Myanmar’s armed 
forces (‘Tatmadaw’) in parts of the eastern border-
lands since 1983/84, displacement figures rapidly in-
creased and internal and cross-border displacement 
became more and more protracted (Lang, 2002). The 
first refugee camps on the Thai border were estab-
lished from 1984 onwards.9 
The causes of displacement within and from  
Myanmar are multiple and overlap each other.10 One 
can roughly differentiate three principal strands of 
displacement: There are 1) those who have fled vio-
lence, the direct and indirect impacts of armed con-
flict in the borderlands and persecution based on  
ethnicity, 2) the Rohingya who have been confronted 
with what the UN considers ethnic cleansing, and 
 
9 \  Today, it is estimated that there are 635,000 conflict-induced IDPs  
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre , May 2018) and 451,104 
Burmese people under the mandate of the UNHCR in the neighbour-
ing countries. Thailand that shares a 2,401 kilometre-long border with 
Myanmar alone hosts 99,886 (March 2018) refugees from Myanmar in 
nine camps in four provinces along the Thai‒Myanmar border, most of 
them belonging to the ethnic minorities of the Karen (79.8%) and the 
Karenni (10.2%) (The Border Consortium, 2018).
10 \  Besides these violent conflicts and their consequences, forced reloca-
tions due to development projects such as dams or the Asia Highway 
are widespread. Poor livelihood conditions, education opportunities 
and health services, especially in rural areas, are common in Myanmar. 
All these factors contribute to ongoing displacement and large migra-
tion flows. The number of refugees and people in refugee-like situa-
tions from Myanmar is estimated at 451,105 as of mid-2016 (UNHCR 
population statistics). The number of conflict-induced IDPs is estimated 
at 635,000 as of December 2017 ( Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, May 2018). In the same year, an additional 351,000 people had 
been newly internally displaced by disasters. Thailand is one of the 
main host countries of displaced persons as well as labour migrants 
from Myanmar. In 2016, over half a million (560,832) Burmese lived in 
Thailand under the mandate of UNHCR (United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, 2016; 2017a). According to estimates, however, 
between 1,5 and five million Burmese live in Thailand, be it as refugees, 
labour migrants, irregular or educational migrants (Herman, 2016; 
Martin, 2007; Ma, 2017). This means that less than every tenth DP lives 
in one of the nine official refugee camps (“temporary shelters”) along 
the border (99,886 by March 2018; The Border Consortium, 2018;  United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017c).
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Especially in Kachin and Northern Shan State, civil-
ians close to the front line are stuck. They are neither 
in camps nor made it to a safe distance. Most of the 
time they were immobilized due to financial prob-
lems, lack of access to alternative livelihoods or any 
options of a safe haven. As they have been unable to 
escape the threats permanently, they usually flee to 
the nearby forest either overnight or over some days 
and hide out there. Some also stay for extended peri-
ods of time in their jungle hideouts, e.g. during the 
whole farming season. This strategy has the advan-
tage that they do not lose access to their livelihoods. 
Once they have left for good, they are not allowed to 
return—as their areas are declared unsafe for return 
by the army. 
Many other IDPs live in spontaneous shelters, 
camps, church or temple compounds, or with hosts 
(IDMC estimates: 635,000, UNHCR: 450,000 IDPs). 
Once NGOs or armed groups—depending on which 
side of the front line the DPs are found—take over, 
limited access to markets, infrastructure and health 
amenities is arranged. Those administrated by ethnic 
armed groups, such as the KNU, get assistance 
through the respective organizations; in this case the 
Karen Office of Relief and Development and The Border 
Consortium (TBC) across the border. In Karenni and 
Mon State, most IDPs stay in areas controlled by the 
Karenni Army between Loikaw and the Thai border 
respectively by the Mon National Liberation Army 
(MNLA) close to the three Pagodas pass to Thailand. 
IDPs who stay in those areas are generally free to 
travel. However, due to insecurity and fears of attacks, 
movements are often limited to the vicinities. 
Many IDPs, finally, turn into refugees, and return-
ing refugees turn into IDPs. This process is gradual, 
not linear and often not documented. People and 
their adaption strategies are more dynamic than the 
differentiation between IDPs and refugees might sug-
gest. Statistical numbers, therefore, have to be taken 
with a grain of salt.13  With regard to their legal status 
in Thailand, persons who have been displaced from 
13 \  The case of a 51-year-old Karen women, who was internally displaced 
twice before she crossed the border to Thailand and reached a camp 
can be called paradigmatic. She did not possess a Burmese ID and was 
only able to register once she got in touch with UNHCR (interview 
with Karen women in Nu Po Camp, July 2016).
Myanmar encompass a very diverse group of people. 
These groups range from recognized refugees (or as 
the Thai government puts it: “displaced people escap-
ing from fighting”) who stay in one of the temporary 
shelters to off-camp populations such as undocu-
mented or irregular migrants, to labour migrants and 
students.14  Drivers for such cross-border movements 
are diverse: Tens of thousands of minors are being 
sent or are coming for educational purposes to the 
camps, joining monasteries or attending migrant 
schools in the cities (though many also had experi-
enced conflict and violence in the border regions). For 
adults, prospects for better livelihood opportunities 
and health services are important factors. Hopes for 
resettlement in a third country (despite decreased 
chances) have also been playing a significant role for 
movements into Thailand.
Methodology and research design
Our research took a qualitative approach. We con-
ducted on-the-spot observations, focus group discus-
sions and in-depth qualitative narrative interviews 
in Thailand and Myanmar with displaced persons, 
members of the host communities, experts, interna-
tional humani-tarian and development actors, local 
civil society organizations dealing with displacement 
and human rights, representatives of refugees and 
IDPs as well as political organizations. We also con-
ducted some interviews with (former) combatants of 
ethnic armed organizations as armed actors proved 
to play an important role both for return and (re-)in-
tegration processes. This resulted in 200 of these in-
terviews and focus group discussions in Thailand and 
14 \  Besides the conflict-induced displaced persons from the Myanmar’s 
south-eastern regions, we find considerable numbers of displaced  
Rohingya from Rakhine State in Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia. 
As new boat people and victims of trafficking, this persecuted group 
made international headlines in 2015. The extent of government officials’ 
involvement in systematic abuses in Thailand has caused political 
uproar. Bases of smugglers and mass graves were found in Thailand’s 
south (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Those who escaped and survived 
are detained in various Immigration Detention Centres. While hun-
dreds of female and child refugees have been released to shelters of 
the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, UNHCR was 
still advocating for the release of the male Rohingya. Another important 
group of forced migrants in Thailand not covered in this study are traf-
ficked persons, mainly women and children supposed to work in the 
sex industry and young men shanghaied on fishing boats.
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Myanmar. Two junior assistants did an additional 39 
individual interviews plus three focus group inter-
views with persons that self-identified as displaced 
persons and labour migrants. The assistants were re-
cruited, trained and supervised during our field stay. 
To take into account developments in the highly dy-
namic context of displacement in and from Myanmar, 
two additional senior research assistants conducted 
longitudinal field research enabling us to constantly 
update our results until spring of the year 2018.
Though it was impossible to set up a representa-
tive sample due to reasons of time and staff, the au-
thors tried to depict the diversity of displaced persons 
from and in Myanmar by taking into account differ-
ent ethnicities, gender and age groups, diverse liveli-
hood contexts in- and off-camp and different legal 
status of the displaced, e.g. refugees, labour migrants, 
stateless and undocumented persons. Regarding eth-
nicity, the focus lay on Burmese minorities. We fo-
cussed on Shan, Karen and Kachin as the most prom-
inent cases, but also included Rohingya, Karenni and 
Mon in our regional approach. To prevent blind spots, 
representatives of other ethnic minorities such as 
the Chin and Rakhine enlarged the focus. We dis-
cussed the methodology and our results with Thai 
and Burmese counterparts to achieve a participatory 
approach. This meant that from the elaboration of 
specific questions to the interpretation of answers we 
did all we could to strive for unbiased triangulation 
and intercultural sensitivity (e.g. through a kick-off 
workshop in Bangkok). The authors / researchers 
complemented triangulation of all interview data by 
the analysis of country-specific secondary data and 
relevant literature on return and local integration. A 
final workshop in Yangon assured that preliminary 
results were shared with and commented by stake-
holders and all the partners without whom this work 
would not have been possible.
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social inclusion—after decades of exclusion, respond-
ents do not consider it a realistic option. Yet, this does 
not mean that they consider it to be irrelevant.
The respective legal status that is attributed to 
displaced people from Myanmar frames how they are 
coping with those challenges. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, their status can either be beneficial or 
detrimental in their quest for access to HLP, services 
and integration. The status fosters or deters access 
and thereby frames the options. Accordingly, individ-
uals try to claim or refuse the labels within the range 
of choice given by the circumstances.
Some coping strategies are based on the explicit 
reference to a displacement status. These include the 
reliance on humanitarian assistance, livelihood pro-
grammes, educational and health services provided 
by humanitarian actors in the camps as well as the 
employment by humanitarian organizations as camp 
staff. Also, pupils and students attending migrant 
schools in the cities follow livelihood strategies based 
on the reference to their status as exiles.
The  second strand of coping strategies differs 
from those strategies referring to a displacement sta-
tus insofar as it is not based on any claims bound to 
the status of being displaced. On the contrary, it is a 
low-profile strategy with the goal to stay below the 
radar of any authorities. While it is true that a majority 
of Burmese in Thailand do not have a chance of get-
ting recognized as displaced persons and remain  
undocumented or migrant workers against their will, 
this strategy is also actively chosen by Burmese to 
better cope with the challenges of integration. Some 
try to acquire legal residence and work permits as  
migrant workers, some stay and work in Thailand’s 
informal sector. The individual strategies do not nec-
essarily coincide with the legal constraints attached 
to a given status—it is but one option for the individ-
uals. Displaced Burmese frequently switch their  
status according to the trade-off of the respective  
advantages and disadvantages (of the two mentioned 
main strategies). It is quite frequent that displaced 
persons try to combine options, for example by 
sneaking out (and back into) the camps to take up 
work and diversify their income.
       
To differentiate between exceptional and typical 
cases, politicians, civil servants, experts, reporters 
and analysts describe social reality by grouping people 
together. Generalized patterns are labelled, categorized 
and can then be dealt with. By their very nature, gen-
eralizations cannot do justice to each case. Extremes 
are extrapolated, exceptions become a case in point 
for the rule. The delicate part is that the labels often 
have an impact on the labelled persons. For legal  
categories, this effect is even more evident than for 
social roles, for instance as the former might be  
enforced with different means than the latter. Still, 
even a legal framework must be communicated and 
implemented by someone to come into effect. In the 
following, we will scrutinize the categories related to 
displacement, their level of implementation—and 
hence their impact—from the perspective of affected 
individuals. Rather than examining the challenges 
and coping mechanisms for refugees, IDPs and mi-
grants separately, this allows us to study how all of 
those affected by displacement react and how their 
reactions are in turn related to mentioned labels. 
Our ranking of the challenges mentioned by the 
interviewed persons shows the urgency of the chal-
lenges above (housing, land, property–HLP, services, 
integration) in the following order: Access to nutri-
tion and income, to services, to protection and political, 
respectively social, inclusion. This order reflects the 
weight respondents, in general, gave those needs after 
displacement. Each case of displacement differs con-
siderably—and the persons we talked to responded in 
a variety of ways—yet a general pattern is palpable. 
First, the more people have lost access to everyday  
necessities, the more they are affected by displace-
ment. Second, the more they regain access, the more 
such negative consequences are overcome (cf. Cernea, 
2000). It is evident that after life-threatening situa-
tions, the immediate need is to access food. It is also 
apparent that shelter or services such as healthcare 
are a high priority. The fact that protection was mostly 
not mentioned as a top priority reflects the promi-
nence of the efforts to secure access to food and basic 
services in their daily lives and shows that people in 
protracted conflicts have gotten used to the state of 
insecurity. The same holds true for political and  
Strategies to cope with displacement
THE STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH DISPLACEMENT IN MYANMAR AND THAILAND \ M. RUDOLF & C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE
14 \ \ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2018
Access to livelihoods 
Displacement is often connected to the loss of 
land. As livelihood opportunities are frequently based 
on this access, it is crucial to regaining access to land, 
and the question of how to achieve this is, therefore, 
a crucial issue for IDPs and refugees in Thailand as 
well as returnees and many hosts.15  IDPs in Myanmar 
struggle with their livelihoods as their conditions 
and access to rights have de facto not changed. Bur-
mese refugees in Thailand struggle with it because a 
full and de jure local integration, i.e. residence and 
work titles, are out of reach. This status quo, in turn, 
influences the decision of many DPs in Thailand to 
opt for return or against seeking refugee status.  
Returnees and hosts also struggle with securing their 
livelihood in the process of (re)adapting to the changes 
caused by displacement. 
Land, work and entitlement
On both sides of the border, DPs’ difficulties relat-
ed to land are quite similar. In Myanmar, forced relo-
cations caused by infrastructure projects and system-
atic land grabbing by armed actors play a significant 
role regarding the lack of access to land. Here, the 
military often restricts access to large parts of the 
land, blaming it on insecurity. IDPs deplore a system-
atic land grab by the Tatmadaw that allegedly cooper-
ate with the office of land registration. We observed 
that the amount of land that has been fenced off by 
the military is indeed considerable. Behind sheer 
endless walls, Myanmar’s armed forces have built 
small cities with workshops and greenhouses, where 
cohorts of soldiers can be observed cultivating the land. 
15 \  With the term livelihoods we refer to the “capabilities, assets (stores, 
resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of 
living: A livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover 
from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and  
assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next 
generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at 
the local and global levels and in the short and long term” (Chambers 
& Conway, 1991, p.7).  
In many parts of the world, including rural Myanmar, land is more 
than a resource to access a means of living: Living off the land is the 
only possibility to survive without making a living. This means that if 
they have access to land, even without access to any market, people 
can assure access to food.
Various displaced communities that live next to 
their original settlements reported that the best 
chunks of land along the main streets had been con-
fiscated and never given back (Northern Shan State). 
Many areas occupied by the Tatmadaw are situated 
around or close to mines (various interviews July to 
September 2016). Furthermore, the army has also 
claimed land in the border area. “[There] they claim 
to … secure the border. But according to me, they want 
to get a foot in the door of the drug traffic,” an anony-
mous NGO employee (working in Lashio, September 
2016) commented. The continuing prevalence of the 
very same imminent threat people had fled from  
deters them from returning. The vicious circle con-
tinues: During displacement, their vulnerability  
increases due to the loss of access to livelihoods. 
Upon return, their vulnerability increases as the con-
ditions have often not changed (cf. Box 1).
Box 1  
Involuntary return to Stone Village
In autumn 2016, people from Stone Village, Kachin, had to return to 
their village, even though it is close to the actual front line and lies be-
hind the military checkpoint that marks the end of the area that is 
controlled by the govern-ment. This area is far from appeased and not 
even demined. As a consequence, previous live-lihood activities, such as 
living off the forest and the mountains surrounding the village, were 
impossible. Agricultural work is rare—thus the village’s name. Life be-
fore displacement was hard, the women reported, and it deteriorated 
further when they lived in the camp. A spokes-person of the women 
explained “Our life now is worse than it was in the camp,” without ac-
cess to their former livelihoods, behind the frontlines and mostly cut 
off from aid. 
Once people have become vulnerable due to a loss 
of access to land respectively livelihoods, the risk of  
experiencing additional vulnerabilities during dis-
placement is common. In Myanmar, returnees and 
IDPs (mostly from ethnic minorities) face extortions, 
forced labour, embezzlement and corruption. Income 
opportunities are often limited by the lack of infra-
structure—goods cannot reach the market due to  
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habitual offenders after a while. They are a signifi-
cant source of income for the officials after all. Posts 
in border, customs or police departments in Mae Sot 
are said to be among the most lucrative ones in 
Thailand.
Undocumented migrants are often arrested or 
forced to pay bribes. “If you are arrested they will fine 
you 100,000 Baht. Or, if you can’t give [them anything], 
they might put you in jail” (Karen refugee, Mae Sot, 
July 2016). Other sources speak of 50 to 500 Baht the 
police charges for not having papers (Representative 
of CIDKP, Mae Sot, July 2016). Refugees that get 
caught outside the camps without valid documents 
are considered illegal migrants and face detention or 
deportation or are again forced to pay bribes. Outside 
the camps, refugees might also become victims of  
violence without any chance of getting justice.  
Reportedly, there have been incidents where public 
security forces forced undocumented migrants to 
work for them (local activist, Mae Sot, 18 July 2016).  
In some incidents, refugees have been found shot 
outside the camps (NGO representative, 11.11.2016). 
Reliance on humanitarian assistance 
To cope with livelihood insecurity, parts of the 
displaced population in Thailand and Myanmar rely 
on service provisions by humanitarian and develop-
ment actors. IDP camps in Myanmar are run either 
by the ethnic armed groups (EAGs) in the autonomous 
areas or by various international NGOs together with 
the Burmese government. In Rakhine State, the  
Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has the lead in 
camp management. In Kachin State, the churches 
play a major role. In Karen areas, the dependence on 
humanitarian aid deliveries, especially cross-border 
aid by TBC, has been high. IDPs in KNU-controlled  
areas reported that KNU did not allow them to do 
farming arguing that they would receive enough sup-
port by TBC and that farming would have a negative 
impact on the environment. Only now, with cuts in 
the food delivery to IDP settlements, does KNU  
reportedly allow IDPs to do farming (interview with 
40-year-old male Karen IDP village leader, July 2016).
adverse road conditions. In Shan State, locals  
recounted: “The transport routes are blocked by the 
military. We risk to either pay a bribe or lose our prod-
ucts”. Respondents also feared to be recruited for 
forced labour. This situation, in turn, fosters the deci-
sion of farmers to cultivate poppy. “It can easily be 
transported on less frequented paths and the price is 
good” (Shan male, July 2016). The persistent prefer-
ence farmers have for the drugs trade is, in other 
words, due to high profits for poppy and few alterna-
tives for making money in the agricultural sector. 
In Thailand, the undocumented migrants and 
refugees, in particular, are also vulnerable to exploita-
tion. The major hazard is related to their legal status. 
Most Burmese in Thailand have no choice but to take 
up jobs in the informal labour market. Undocumented 
migrants, as well as registered refugees, work primarily 
in the agricultural, service, construction and sex  
industry, the fishing and manufacturing sectors. They 
usually earn a lot less than the official Thai minimum 
wage of 350 Baht/day in most of the western Thai 
border regions (Mon, 2010). Non-Thais are neither  
allowed to acquire land nor houses. It is difficult for 
undocumented Burmese migrant workers to find a 
place to rent: “The patron or friends help you and put 
you up”, a Shan male worker explained (September 2016). 
Due to their precarious legal status, migrant 
workers frequently become victims of hazardous 
working conditions, human trafficking and forced  
labour. Occasionally, there are police raids on compa-
nies that employ illegal Burmese workers. In May 
2016, for example, roughly 10,000 people were deported.16 
Yet, it is quite common that the deportees quickly 
find their way back to Thailand (representative of 
ADRA, Mae Sot, July 2016; Ranong human rights 
groups). Police in areas like Ranong and Mae Sot with 
high numbers of illegal migrants often tolerated  
 
16 \  In June 2017, the Thai government nevertheless issued a new labour 
law providing harsh punishment against firms that hire undocumented 
(foreign) workers. This triggered an exodus of migrants to Myanmar. 
Immigration officials put this exodus at 60,000 (23-28 June). With the 
sudden absence of thousands of workers, many Thai companies were 
under pressure. The country‘s military leaders, therefore, delayed the 
implementation of the new law until January 2018 to allow illegal 
workers to register and apply for proper documents. They also called 
for a public hearing to receive input from companies and workers 
(Martin, 2007).
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expected to decrease further (TBC representative, 
Mae Sot, July 2016). Since then, food rations provided 
by the Border Consortium have also continually de-
creased forcing refugees in the camps again to follow 
additional strategies for securing their livelihoods. 
This means, in sum, that the challenge to secure live-
lihoods is exceptionally high for those who have not 
been able to diversify their livelihoods beyond aid yet. 
According to our interview data, the decrease in live-
lihood options outside the camps due to increased  
restrictions of movement, the reduction of food rations 
in the camps and the uncertainty about their future 
prospects when the camps close down are already  
indirectly pushing refugees and IDPs to return.
Relation of encampment and dependency 
With decreasing rations in the camps, it became 
evident that displaced persons usually do not rely  
exclusively on humanitarian assistance. While there 
are some blind spots concerning the conditions of 
the population in and off camps in Myanmar, more is 
known about the interrelation of access to livelihoods 
and dependency in Thailand. The refugees adopt  
coping strategies that contribute to the evolvement 
of a cash economy in the camps. This cash economy 
is bigger in well-connected areas, like Mae La, which 
is close to surrounding communities and the boom-
ing border town of Mae Sot than in camps in remote 
areas. An INGO representative estimated that in Mae 
La, two-thirds of the population have access to cash 
income besides the rations distributed by TBC: INGOs, 
for instance, employ one-third of the camp refugees. 
Another third receives money from resettled relatives 
or irregular work (Mae Sot, July 2016). Burmese DPs’ 
modes of livelihood have changed considerably over 
time.17  Inside the shelters for IDPs and refugees, 
17 \  Longitudinal fieldwork conducted by Lee (2014) showed that the RTG 
did not guarantee any institutional support for the refugees nor inter-
fered in the NGOs’ activities of providing food and shelter or in the ref-
ugees’ livelihood activities until 1995. However, between 1995 and 2005, 
the RTG changed its stance towards refugees considerably—mainly 
due to border security concerns resulting from the collapse of Karen 
strongholds and cross-border attacks by the Burmese army and DKBO 
forces. RTG initiated a policy of “control” and “regulation” (Lee, 2014, p. 
469). The number of camps were reduced from 30 to 12, guard forces 
were reforced, camps fenced and checkpoints established. This de-
crease severely restricted the refugees’ mobility and livelihood  
opportunities. Refugees were no longer able to move out of the camps, 
and agricultural spaces inside the camps were heavily reduced. As a 
In Thailand, the Royal Thai government (RTG) 
runs all camps, while UNHCR focuses on protection 
activities and programmes as well as resettlement 
procedures. Although the shelters have existed for 
more than 30 years now, the RTG insists on the term 
of temporariness. It tolerates the camp population on 
its grounds but does not grant official refugee status 
to the displaced let alone open paths towards achiev-
ing citizenship. Camp residents are officially neither 
allowed to exit the camps nor to take up work outside 
the camps. This situation renders them highly de-
pendent on humanitarian service delivery—mainly 
provided by The Border Consortium and other INGOs. 
These services include the provision of nutrition, 
shelter, healthcare, education, sanitation, training, 
income or resettlement opportunities. 
Despite restrictions that have considerably in-
creased, particularly since 2014,many refugees have 
been seeking to combine international aid provisions 
with other livelihood strategies. “Usually, the men 
leave the camp in the rainy season for three or four 
months and come back only once a month to get  
registered and to receive their rations” (Karen refugee, 
Mae La, July 2016). Even though this has been a  
pattern ever since, the rate of such cases has increased 
lately due to the reduced food rations: NGO staff  
reported that they were wondering why the young 
men were not available for farming training courses 
during their holidays until they discovered that they 
had been farming their fields on the other side of the 
border. Despite the risks involved, the refugees had to 
compensate the rations that were reduced by the  
international organisations as a consequence of  
decreasing humanitarian funding for the region (all 
camps on the Thai side). Similar cases have been  
encountered regarding IDPs in disputed areas. 
Since the onset of the democratization process, 
most agencies have started orientating themselves 
towards Myanmar. It is expected that Thailand will 
soon close down all camps and withdraw all funds. 
Staff and operations have either already moved or are 
in the process of moving across the border. Since 2012, 
TBC has received only half of its funding for shelters 
than before due to donor cuts, and the funds are 
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get jobs in the ever-increasing humanitarian and de-
velopment cooperation sector. The most jobs of re-
turnees that we encountered during our fieldwork 
were indeed reported to be with either INGOs or 
teachers that returned to work with their respective 
ethnic communities.
Access to basic services
In Myanmar, members of ethnic minorities  
deplore the lacking access to healthcare and education 
in their native tongue respectively the poor quality or 
high costs of both. The ethnic minorities feel that 
they are not only on the periphery in a geographical 
sense but also regarding basic services. For years, 
healthcare in the periphery has only been provided 
by non-state actors. The local population has been left 
to fend for themselves. The central government keeps 
ignoring burning issues like that one of the highest 
Burmese rate of drug addicts and HIV in Kachin State 
as well as the language barrier. Even though many 
non-Bamar do not understand Burmese, the ability to 
speak the language is required as a sine quae non in 
the school system throughout Myanmar. Those expe-
riences related to access to health care and education 
enforce the widely shared impression among ethnic 
minorities that the current ethnocentric regime dis-
advantages them, and that the system is representing 
a policy of cultural hegemony (Walton, 2013). The  
absence of services has been met with two comple-
menting strategies: Migration to Thailand and local 
capacity-building. 
Health infrastructure
The lack of infrastructure in the border areas is  
especially evident in healthcare. A considerable num-
ber of humanitarian actors have been criticizing the 
underdeveloped, underfinanced, understaffed and 
low-quality health system (Latt et al., 2016; Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 2008; Risso-Gill, McKee, Coker, Piot, & 
Legido-Quigley, 2014). The demand for health services 
in areas of protracted conflict clashes with the actual 
level of access to it. There are more fatal injuries as a 
result of shootings, mine incidents, victims of abuse 
sewing and weaving are important income-generat-
ing activities. Different NGOs run diverse livelihood 
projects like small animal raising and small-scale  
agricultural activities, as in Karen, Karenni and Kachin 
camps. These livelihood programmes by INGOs— 
designed and implemented in a strikingly similar 
way both in IDP and in refugee camps—are in high 
demand. Critics point out that the activities are not 
always sustainable. The income generated in the 
small gardens in IDP or refugee camps is criticized 
for being insufficient and the pig raising activities, 
e.g. in Kachin, for not being diversified enough. But, 
participating women told us, they had joined the so-
called livelihood groups not only to increase their  
income but also to 1) follow any economic activity at 
all, 2) provide for their families and to 3) eventually 
share their acquired knowledge.
A successful livelihood strategy that has evolved 
in the refugee camps during the last decades of  
humanitarian action is to work as staff for one of the 
many INGOs. All organizations heavily depend on 
camp staff to keep their programmes running. This 
offers refugees some income and the opportunity to 
gain valuable language and professional skills. These 
skills, in turn, serve them when they decide to leave 
the camps and work as either labour migrants or as 
undocumented migrants in Thai communities or 
upon return to Myanmar. An NGO representative 
pointed out that none of their 130 camp staff 
members were interested in receiving Thai work 
certificates. They planned to return to Myanmar to 
consequence, living conditions in the camps deteriorated. While until 
1995, INGOs supplied only 50 per cent of the food needed by the refu-
gees, INGOs provided for 100 per cent of the refugees’ food needs (Lee 
2014, p. 470). In other words, the refugees became completely reliant on 
external food aid. 2005 to 2011 was again marked by a shift of the RTG’s 
perspective on refugees: From being perceived as security risk, they 
turned into a useful economic resource. The Thaksin government 
strongly focused on development projects, particularly in border  
regions. In 2004, Mae Sot and its surroundings was declared a special 
economic zone. The RTG approved skills-training projects designed to 
produce household income, improve livelihoods, employment oppor-
tunities and agreed to support education in the camps by setting up 
learning centres with a focus on teaching the Thai language. In 2007, 
Thailand issued identity cards to some 85,000 refugees in the camps 
(Lee, 2014, p. 472; Betts & Loescher, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 2008). Today, 
after the military coup of 2014, confinement policies are still in place, 
and regulations are more strictly enforced. The nearby farmers already 
complain about losing workers, just as bus drivers do about having 
fewer customers.
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to establish an autonomous curriculum for pupils, 
teachers and school boards in areas controlled by 
EAGs inside Myanmar and in camps have therefore 
been considerable. As they were deliberately pursuing 
an agenda of resistance, the policies used to run 
counter to the official Burmese curriculum. The nega-
tive result of this system has been that students are 
often secluded from tertiary education (Lall & South, 
2014).
The chances of accessing such tertiary education 
have, as a matter of fact, been traditionally slim for 
ethnic minorities. These groups, also denounced as 
hill tribes, montagnards, or highlanders, have been 
discriminated by the respective majorities throughout 
South East Asia. The groups are quite diverse, but they 
are united by the fact they have been excluded on 
multiple levels from state services (Formoso, 2010; 
Laungaramsri, 2014; Michaud, 2013; Scott, 2009; Smith, 
2005; Toyota, 2005; Winland, 1992). In Myanmar, their 
vernacular excluded them first and foremost from 
Burmese education. In offering education to minori-
ties, missionaries and churches were the first to find 
an alternative path to support them in their struggle 
to gain access to education. Missionaries usually not 
only translated and catalogued languages of minorities 
but also offered education as way out of marginality 
to them. Today, still, many of the encountered net-
works that have facilitated access to higher education 
in the capital Yangon or abroad are a result of personal 
relations with missionaries. 
International aid providers have continued and 
expanded the work that the missionaries had started. 
Awareness of the value of education among the refu-
gees from Myanmar has risen considerably over the 
last decades. Also, groups that are less often recognized 
as refugees like the Shan have benefitted from con-
tact with international aid. But also ethnic armed 
groups and other community-based providers have 
established ethnic basic education in their areas of 
influence and throughout the camps (see above and 
Davis & Jolliffe, 2016). The quality of ethnic based edu-
cation reportedly often exceeds that of national 
schools in Myanmar. Especially the knowledge of 
English as a foreign language is much better due to 
the presence of native speakers in the education 
and torture that need medical assistance; there are 
also more persons suffering from secondary and ter-
tiary effects—yet there are fewer hospitals and medical 
staff than in other areas.18  Due to the structural and 
continuous lack of health care services, ethnic and 
community-based health organizations have stepped 
in (cf. Jolliffe, 2014). Their relative success on various 
levels has been widely documented (cf. Mahn et al., 
2008; Teela et al., 2009). 
In Thailand, international aid agencies can only 
provide health services for those who have a proper 
migrant status. Undocumented migrants often have 
no such access. Displaced persons themselves had to 
step in to close these service gaps. Alcohol and drug 
consumption, for example, affect especially the poorest 
among the refugees. These vices, often in combination 
with large debts and gambling, are related to high  
suicide rates within the camps (representative of 
ADRA, Mae Sot, July 2016). The Mae Tao Clinic near 
Mae Sot is an example of how persons affected by dis-
placement have managed to help each other based on 
their needs. It was founded by a Myanmar refugee 
and offers medical treatment free of charge for labour 
migrants and undocumented migrants. 
Education and schooling
The lack of access displaced persons have to basic 
services like health and education services has led to 
a multitude of responses both from affected persons 
and international aid in Myanmar and Thailand. 
These responses show how local coping strategies 
evolve in interrelation with external aid and,how this 
combination influences future trajectories. The de-
mand for cultural autonomy and the fear of a cultural 
hegemony of Bamar culture has, for example, been a 
major driver of resistance among all ethnic armed 
groups (EAGs). Educational policies were part of the 
quest for autonomy (cf. Horstmann, 2015). The efforts 
18 \  Secondary effects are secondary diseases caused by a lack of treatment 
or no access to hospitals for e.g. accidents, diseases or pregnancies.  
Tertiary effects are linked to traumatized family members, respectively 
drug or alcohol addicts. The latter are directly linked to the protracted 
conflict because drug abuse and trafficking are generally said to thrive 
in protracted conflicts. In Kachin State, for instance, every family is 
said to have a heroin user amongst them. This affects the rate of HIV 
and, in turn, the work of health providers such as MSF that operate the 
only hospital in town for such treatment (MSF clinic Bahmo, Kachin, 
August 2017).
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migrant school was founded in Mae Sot in 1991. In 
the 2000s, the number of schools heavily increased 
and so did the number of enrolled students. Migrant 
schools were more and more institutionalized: In 
1999, an umbrella organization of migrant schools, 
the Burmese Migrant Workers’ Education Committee 
(BMWEC), was founded. 
One major hindrance to education is the high 
school fees in the camps. According to a female inter-
viewee, school fees are as high as 150 Baht (approxi-
mately four euro) per semester or higher. Bible school 
in Mae La reportedly costs 1,000 to 2,250 Baht per  
semester (focus group discussion at Mae La, July 2016). 
Undocumented migrant workers in Thailand struggle 
with education, too. Only migrant children who are 
officially registered in school or who have parents 
who are documented workers are normally counted 
in official data. This renders undocumented out-of-
school migrant children largely invisible. However, 
more and more migrant children have enrolled in 
Thai schools since the “Education for All” (EFA) policy 
was adopted in 1999 and a cabinet resolution on the 
same issue followed in 2005.
Drive for social change
The example of education shows how migrants 
and refugees compare and combine benefits, and how 
this, in turn, influences individual trajectories across 
borders. Due to the high reputation of the migrant 
schools, some students who would have the chance 
to attend Thai schools opt deliberately for migrant 
schools. It has become common practice among the 
Burmese to send their children to Thai temporary 
shelters to let them attend the camp schools, where 
children are taught in English already at the primary 
level. Mae La Camp is said to host approximately 
3,000 boarding house students. While parents often 
stay in Myanmar, these children frequently live with 
relatives in the camps or boarding houses and go 
back to their parents in Myanmar during the summer 
break. Camp staff in Thailand recounted that most 
newcomers are usually students who arrive without 
their parents. In contrast to families who have stayed 
in the camp for decades, these students often return 
to Myanmar. In Myanmar, the parallel systems of 
system. International staff even teaches in the offi-
cially not recognized camp Koung Jor on the Thai– 
Myanmar border. This opportunity, in turn, has  
attracted non- refugee Myanmar nationals to tempo-
rarily stay in the camp. The presence of international 
teachers, language and migrant schools has opened 
up long-term perspectives at international universi-
ties and institutions. A shortfall of this model is that 
the often US-American-oriented curriculum has been 
making it harder to access the respective national  
institutions of higher education.19 
The abundance and increasing formalization of 
the learning centres respectively migrant schools  
referred to above is an example of the organizational 
skills and capacities of refugees in Thailand:20 Infor-
mal and illegal, migrant schools in Mae Sot, however, 
operated “on a persistent and regular basis, as a non-
state informal institution” (Lee, 2012a, p. 127). In con-
trast to other migrant schools across the world that 
are mainly set up by the state and school mainly citi-
zens of the receiving country, the migrant schools in 
Thailand were established by migrants themselves in 
cooperation with NGOs, and enrolled students are 
mainly foreign nationals (Lee, 2012a, p. 126). The first 
19 \  Today, migrant schools are “strongly and visibly rooted in almost 
every migrant living compound scattered all over town” (Lee, 2012,  
p. 125) and there are 64 migrant schools in Mae Sot alone, according to 
a volunteer teacher (BEAM school, Chiang Mai). The growth of migrant 
schools has certainly also improved conditions for undocumented mi-
grants (Lee, 2012, p. 135). However, the lack of centralized oversight and 
limited resources are heavily restricting possibilities. The Thai and 
Myanmar governments formally recognize only some of the learning 
centres, and although many migrant schools accept undocumented 
migrants, the vast majority of students go through their basic education 
without receiving any accreditation. This is severely limiting their 
future education options and job prospects (Save the Children & World 
Education, 2014). Despite large numbers of graduates, very few are able 
to obtain secondary education. Those who cannot study further, usually 
volunteer in camp schools or return to Burma (migrant school teacher, 
Chiang Mai, July 2016). The main strength of the education system—
its autonomy—has certain drawbacks. The education system is 
self-referential and for now mostly qualifies pupils to either reproduce 
the system (by becoming teachers) themselves or to work with NGOs 
(Mae Sot, Ban Mai Nai Soi, August 2016).
20 \  Thai law stipulates that all children, regardless of their nationality or 
legal status, have the right to 15 years of free basic education (Save the 
Children and World Education, 2014). But still, it is estimated that 
more than 60 per cent of migrant children (200,000) in Thailand do not 
attend school (Save the Children and World Education, 2014). For those 
who attend school, there are two options: Learning centres and Thai 
schools. 34 per cent attend Thai schools, five per cent attend learning 
centres that are largely unaccredited institutions (Save the Children 
and World Education, 2014).
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July 2016). Others have returned to Myanmar because 
of the schools and opportunities for higher education. 
In Hpa-An, students, for instance, reported to have 
better opportunities than in Thailand—a conclusion 
that requires an informed and transnational assess-
ment of the restrictions and options DPs have.
Besides the highly visible structures in the area 
of health and education, other coping mechanisms of 
displaced Burmese in Thailand and the border areas 
have been institutionalized over time. The probably 
most successful socio-political structures are the  
various, relatively autonomous refugee organizations. 
The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and the Karenni 
Refugee Committee (KnRC), for example, successfully 
ensured that the refugee and the local population  
remain in close contact. While they have been main-
taining strong linkages to their respective ethnic 
groups in Myanmar, they have also taken up impor-
tant representative and organizational functions in 
the border camps. Nowadays, they oversee all activities, 
coordinate assistance provided by NGOs and liaise 
with UNHCR, the RTG and security personnel. 
The example of these refugee organizations was 
followed by others, and the level of social organization 
and capacities of community leadership among refu-
gees today is much higher than that of IDPs in Myan-
mar. Members of other sizeable sectors of the popula-
tion—commonly organized along ethnic lines—also 
set up their own organizations. The main women and 
youth committees are the Karen Women’s Organization 
(KWO), the Karenni National Women’s Organizations 
KNWO), the Karen Youth Organization (KYO), the  
Karenni National Youth Organizations (KNYO), the 
Burmese Women’s Union in Ban Mai Noi Soi and the 
Muslim Youth Association in Umpiem Mai. The  
capacity of community leadership transcends ethnic 
lines: the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) is an  
umbrella organization of women’s groups from all 
over Myanmar. Also, there is an abundance of NGOs 
and CBOs set up or supported by Burmese refugees 
exemplifying their self-organizational capacities.
ethnic basic education providers (EBEP) and state 
schools have led to a double qualification of many 
ethnic minority members. It is common practice 
nowadays, e.g. Karen, to attend both schools.
The change of individual options related to dis-
placement has accelerated social change. Young refu-
gees, who have received a relatively good education in 
the camps and the migrant schools, in particular, 
have a different perspective on livelihood activities 
than previous generations or more isolated groups. 
Many voiced the wish to return as a teacher to their 
place of origin. However, due to low wages and feared 
ethnic discrimination against them, they rate their 
chances of entering public services as slim. Inter-
viewees criticized the education policy of the Myanmar 
government for discriminating local culture and  
excluding workers from ethnic minorities. Burmese 
schools are seen as spearheading and imposing 
Bamar culture in the border regions. Karen teachers 
are said to earn a lot less than Bamar teachers—1500 
Baht compared to 6000 Baht per month (Chiang Mai, 
July 2016; Brettell, 2008). 21
The exposure to new options in Myanmar, pri-
marily transmitted through education is, in sum, a 
drive that pulls and pushes people in various direc-
tions. On the one hand, well-trained persons are  
returning while on the other, especially in the rural 
and ethnically controlled areas, people are pushed to 
camps as the only viable chance of receiving an edu-
cation in Myanmar. For others who wish to return, 
the quest for education leads to contrasting results. 
Some potential returnees fear that they would have 
to drop out of school due to the high expenditures, 
since “[they] have no one who will help them with 
their food, housing, schools and travelling fee” (focus 
group interview with young adults at Nu Po Camp, 
21 \  Interviewees also mentioned the fear that the authorities in Myanmar 
may not accept the certificates from the camps in Thailand: “We don’t 
have a chance to higher education in Myanmar because the certificates 
that we got from refugee schools are not accepted in Myanmar (focus 
group discussion with Karen college students, Umpiem Mai Camp, 
July 2016). “All refugees finished school in the refugee camp. They also 
have some vocational skills to work in the community or an organization. 
But when we’re back in Burma, we cannot work or continue our future 
study in government schools because the education from the camp is 
not accepted by the Myanmar government” (Focus group discussion 
with Karen junior college students, Umpiem Mai Camp, July 2016).
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On a micro level, it is indeed often difficult to see 
positive developments with regard to the armed con-
flicts. Quite the contrary is the case: In Northern 
Shan State, the number of ethnic armed groups has 
been steadily rising due to the ‘divide and rule’ tactic 
of the army. The continuous presence of EAGs worries 
especially families with young men. Drafting young 
men into EAGs has been a common strategy among 
the armed actors and is still an important reason why 
people flee their homes and refuse to return. One for-
mer child soldier with the KNU and DKBA stated that 
he still fears forced recruitment upon return to Karen 
State (interview with Karen student, Chiang Mai, July 
2016). With the fragmentation of EAGs and the rise of 
inter- ethnic fights in Northern Shan State, those  
recruitments have risen lately (interviews around 
Lashio, September 2016). To avoid his son from being 
drafted, a father of an interviewed person in Northern 
Shan State, for example, had volunteered in his son's 
stead and was killed recently. The brothers of the inter-
viewee hid in monasteries and one sister in the nearest 
town. To this day, young men are sent to monasteries 
to avoid forced recruitment. 
Among DPs, there are various levels of support  
for the armed ethnic actors, and they differ from one 
individual to another as well as from one ethnic group 
to another: While the majority of Kachin refugees 
strongly support the KIO, it seems that the Karen ref-
ugees are more divided in regard to supporting the 
KNU lately (expert interview, NGO representative, 
Mae Sot, September 2016). Still, nationalism among 
the Karen in Thailand is often stronger than in Karen 
State (expert interview, Bonn, September 2016). In the 
border areas, in temporary shelters or camps, large 
parts of the displaced population are organized in 
ethnic political organizations. The Refugee Committees 
such as KRC and KNRC usually have a considerable 
authority—based on their history of representing the 
refugees’ interests. The organizations abroad are usually 
closely connected to the ethnic political actors in  
Myanmar. This is why many refugees and field staff 
stressed that the population usually trusts and follows 
their leaders in their decisions. 
hard to find. As victims have doubts about the rule of law or, even 
worse, fear further reprisals because armed groups are still operating, 
they are usually reluctant to report such incidents publicly.
Access to protection
Insecurity and ongoing fighting present a signifi-
cant challenge both to IDP and refugee return in 
many parts of Myanmar.22  After the democratic elec-
tions, fighting has stepped up again and has intensified 
in the border region. “We hear about the peace talks, 
but we see something different. There are soldiers, air 
raids, mines”, people in IDP camps in Kachin report 
(August 2016). Even where peace talks are effectively 
in place, action taken by the army is anything but trust- 
building: “In my area, the military told the ethnic 
armed group: you misunderstood. When we said we 
will pull back from this area we meant that we now 
work together. We will both control the area. We can-
not, and we will not go back” (Southern Shan State, 
July 2016).
Ongoing insecurity 
Landmine contamination—especially in Kayin, 
Kachin and Karenni State—is a significant security 
concern. Those who did not leave high-risk mined  
areas declared: “We do not have a choice”. Interna-
tional staff deplored that, in addition to those who 
are immobilized, many IDPs in Kachin were sent 
back into areas that had not yet been declared mine-
free (Bahmo, September 2016). Maps of mines, in  
general, are either not available or cannot be trusted, 
since improvised explosive devices are widely used. 
As there is no exact information about mines availa-
ble, their spread is difficult to assess, but we were told 
on our visit in August 2016 that there were many in 
the Bahmo area, for instance. A major difficulty is 
that neither the Myanmar government nor the ethnic 
armed groups are willing to demine yet, a fact that is 
attributed to the lack of trust in the nation-wide 
ceasefire agreement (DCA, Chiang Mai, July 2016).23  
22 \  DPs in Thailand generally considered themselves safe and secure in 
regard to the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar despite ambushes by the 
Tatmadaw and DKBO on refugee camps in the past. Refugees and  
undocumented migrants nonetheless frequently become victims of 
police violence, arbitrariness and forced labour (NGO representative, 
Mae Sot, July 2016). Also, domestic violence and petty crime inside the 
camps are protection issues that were mentioned as severe problems 
both by INGOs and refugees.
23 \  According to a DCA representative, there were less than 1,000 mine 
victims in the last two or three decades, and only three to four were 
officially reported from mid-2015 to 2016. According to our observation, 
this number seems low. Numbers that are more exact, however, are 
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negotiations about a ceasefire concern only armed 
actors (WLB representative, Chiang Mai, July 2016). 
Many national and international organizations like 
the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) try to influence 
the process despite such odds. The WLB—with limited 
success so far—wants to increase the participation of 
women in the struggle for democracy and human 
rights and advocates a 30 per cent quota for women 
in the negotiations. 
But still, most do not see the necessary conditions 
for return given. Many villagers have been (forcibly) 
relocated to government-controlled areas and report-
edly need official permission of the Burmese authori-
ties to return to their place of origin. Those who  
returned without government permission live in fear 
of being relocated again and thus have not built per-
manent houses (representative of CIDKP, Mae Sot, 
July 2016). Often “family lands were lost and burned” 
(focus group discussion with Karen college students, 
Umpiem Mai Camp, July 2016) and are now occupied 
by various new tenants. Some were told that KNU  
officials are living on their land now (female Karen 
refugee, Mae La camp, July 2016), some said that 
houses built for returnees were given to Shan militias 
(Koung Jor, July 2016). Cases of involuntary return 
(cf. Box 1) show an additional challenge: Upon return, 
IDPs lose livelihood activities that they had developed 
during displacement. Often, they can neither substi-
tute them nor return to activities they pursued before 
they were displaced as livelihood opportunities have 
not yet been re-established in the place of origin. 
DPs usually assess the risks and benefits of differ-
ent options—including return—carefully. Spontaneous 
return demonstrates this clearly (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017b). In general, 
their assessments reveal two main obstacles to sus-
tainable return. First, refugees are often not consulted 
beforehand. “We were told that a deal had been struck, 
that we could go back, and that our houses had been 
built without anybody asking us before” (Koung Jor, 
July 2016). In other words: The community was not 
involved in the process, it had neither chosen the site 
nor verified the commitment of the armed groups. As 
they did not share the assessment of the NGO that 
had initiated the return process and built the houses, 
Peace negotiations and return
Contrary to the high level of trust in their respec-
tive leaders, there is profound mistrust from all sides 
as regards the peace process. Most statements collected 
were related to the negative impact of the political 
framework of Myanmar: “We heard that we got [a] 
new government that will lead to [a] democracy [sic] 
system right now, but they cannot control the mili-
tary or give orders to stop the wars […]” (focus group, 
Umpiem Mai Camp, July 2016). Another Karen refu-
gee stated: “If we want peace, it is in the hand of the 
military not in the current government because the 
power is not in government […] If the international 
community and international organizations can help 
us to force our government and military to change 
the 2008 constitution, there will be peace and free-
dom to set up real democracy […]” (19-year old camp 
resident and former child soldier, Nu Po Camp, July 
2016). This former KNU fighter saw the increased 
presence of the Burmese military (he mentioned the 
number of soldiers and barracks) in Karen State as 
threatening and an impediment to return: “It seems 
like they are going to stay for good in our region. So, I 
feel like there will be war anytime when there is an 
argument or disagreement among governments and 
Karen armies.” He added that, in his opinion, there is 
a high risk of war among the ethnic groups themselves 
considering their increasing fragmentation. 
Despite such risks, reconciliation was rarely  
mentioned as a topic during the interviews. Neither 
as a prerequisite for sustainable peace nor for return 
(female Karen officer at the Education Department, 
Mae Sot, September 2016). This might be related to  
experienced traumata or to the fact that displaced 
persons perceive peace as completely out of reach, as 
a 54-year old Burmese (former political activist from 
Taungoo and now returnee from Mae La Camp Thai-
land) described: “Peace is still a long way away, and it 
will take long to achieve it. I’m not optimistic about 
this peace process. I don’t think NLD [National 
League for Democracy] can bring peace, and these 
peace talks will not bring peace. Reconciliation is not 
possible […]” (South Dagon, May 2017). One of the hin-
drances on the road towards peace is the fact that 
most armed actors, including the Tatmadaw, feel that 
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the combination of religious nationalism and citizen-
ship could alienate non-Buddhist groups and divide the 
nation (Lall, 2014, p. 42 ff.).25  Various interviews that we 
conducted in 2016 showed that Rohingya and other 
Muslims throughout Myanmar had been denied their 
citizenship (August, September 2016; cf. Green,  
Maymanus, & de la Cour Venning, 2015, 56 ff.). The histo-
ry of scapegoating Muslims is still vivid and has driven 
many of them into exile (cf. van Klinken & Aung, 2017; 
McCarthy & Menager, 2017). 
In exile, the problems related to missing docu-
ments continue. Because of the difficulties in obtaining 
papers inside their country of origin, many displaced 
persons and migrants lack IDs, residence permits, birth 
certificates and labour permissions. Burmese birth cer-
tificates or IDs are required if one wants to work as a 
migrant worker. But those who came from areas under 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 \  The population in Myanmar is far from homogenous. We observed 
many interethnic marriages, and various family genealogies include 
various nationalities and ethnicities. Cases where both grandparents 
and parents speak different languages were frequent. The number of 
people that find it hard to reconcile a policy of purity with their per-
sonal history is therefore high—especially in the border areas.
they did not return. Second, the legal access to land is 
unclear.24  Nobody is certain that the people that have 
acquired land and access to resources following the 
displacement of others are willing to give it up. Third, 
trust in the NCA is fragile and long-term prospects of 
peace poor. Many therefore prefer to stick to options 
they consider safe.
Legislation and legal rights
One serious obstacle to both de jure and de facto (re-)
integration of DPs and returnees is the frequent lack of 
documents, particularly birth certificates and identifi-
cation cards needed for gaining access to legal and  
political representation. In conflict-affected areas, in 
areas controlled by EAG or in isolated places like the 
Southern Tanintharyi Region, ethnic minorities only 
have restricted access to identity documents. According 
to an NGO that has stepped in with mobile registration 
offices to provide citizens of Myanmar with legal docu-
ments, 11 million persons do not have an ID in Myanmar. 
For example, most of the elderly Shan do not have 
official Burmese papers. As most do not speak Burmese, 
they are not able to apply for them (interview with 
community leader, Koung Jor, 14/15 July 2016). The same 
is true for IDPs and other vulnerable groups: “Without 
an official ID card, people cannot access medical services, 
open a bank account, go to school or travel anywhere, 
and they can be arrested at any time”, NRC explains in 
a recent report (Jenssen, 2017).
The high number of people without citizenship or 
legal papers is a logical consequence of Myanmar’s mil-
itary junta’s triple strategy to simultaneously promote 
(1) ethnic division, (2) religious nationalism and (3)  
territorial integrity respectively unity over the last  
decades (cf. Kipgen, 2017). Legal obstacles to obtaining 
papers have been used systematically as a means to  
divide and rule (cf. IRIN, 2016). Restructuring the legal 
framework of citizenship had already been identified 
as one of the major challenges before transition started 
(Lall, 2014, pp.10 ff.): Experts explicitly pointed out that 
 
24 \  For those returnees who manage to acquire land for cultivation, there 
are significant differences regarding legal entitlements. While KNU 
issues land titles (ownership of the land), the government only issues 
permissions to use the land (interview with representative of the CID-
KP, Mae Sot July 2016).
Box 2  
Caught between the front lines—Burmese Muslims 
Ahmed was born to a Muslim father and a Buddhist mother. Such  
interfaith marriages became illegal under the law in 2015. His mother 
nevertheless had him registered as a Buddhist under her name even 
before the law came into effect. Ahmed’s whole family is based in  
Yangon, and different family members practise different religions. His 
father was a government official who then did not have any issues with 
his religion. According to Ahmed’s knowledge, his grandfather fought 
for the British and was most likely from India. Both his father and 
grandfather had married a Buddhist and raised their children as  
Muslims. Ahmed got into trouble as a student leader during protests 
against the military regime in the 1990s. He managed to flee to the 
border areas and then to Thailand. There, he succeeded to get a working 
permit and residency papers. He moved on to Singapore where he got a 
job, but he went back to Karen State where he is currently working. He 
lives among others Muslims in a village close to Hpa-An. Despite  
being well aware of anti-Muslim sentiments and discriminatory prac-
tices in Myanmar, he sees more opportunities there than in Thailand. 
Yet, if conditions worsen he would move to another country in South 
East Asia, to the United States, Canada or Europe.
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Local integration 
Despite all bureaucratic hindrances in the border 
areas, especially on the village level, a certain degree 
of “de facto local” integration seems to be possible. 
However, the level of integration into Thai society  
differs substantially depending on ethnolinguistic 
commonalities between the displaced and local host 
communities. This is exemplified by the Karen and 
Shan communities. In western Thailand, the porous 
border to Myanmar and the existence of a Thai Karen 
community facilitates de facto local integration. For 
decades, numerous individuals from the ethnic 
groups of the other side of the border have been in-
formally integrated into the host communities. Even 
today, many displaced Karen settle down in Thai  
Karen villages on the border. There, it is reportedly 
easier for Karen people to locally integrate—which 
includes finding a spouse—while integration in the 
city without Thai ID and language skills is said to be 
much more difficult (female Karen and representative 
of DCA, Chiang Mai, July 2016). 
But interviews with displaced and local experts 
have revealed that the Thai and Karen communities 
in Thailand usually do not mix: “When I was living 
in Thoo Mweh Kee, there were only Karen from Thai-
land and Myanmar. We lived in our community, a little 
bit isolated from the [non-Karen] Thai community. So 
we didn’t have to communicate with the Thai com-
munity that much. As there are also Karen in Thailand, 
they treated us the same. They didn’t do anything to 
us” (female Karen student of a migrant school in 
Chiang Mai, August 2016). Though the Karen reportedly 
enjoy the sympathy of the local population, the rela-
tionship outside the borderlands is often characterized 
by segregation and discrimination. Some Karen, 
therefore, do not speak Thai even after having been 
in Thailand for a long time. Thai‒Burmese marriages 
are not very common. Therefore, many Christian  
Karen convert to Buddhism as a strategy to become 
“more Thai” (expert interview, Bonn November 2016).26 
26 \  On the host side, both fears and an awareness of benefits prevail.  
Refugees usually have to accept lower wages than local residents.  
Consequently, Thai communities fear for their jobs and wages. Yet, 
since the younger generation in northern Thailand usually leaves the 
region to follow job opportunities in the cities, farmers need workers 
on their land. Therefore, the benefits of Burmese workers are not only 
their positive work ethics but also the fact that they offset the nega-
the control of ethnic armed groups have had hardly any 
chance of getting a Burmese ID. Moreover, the lack of 
funds for traveling to Myanmar prevents many DPs 
without papers from obtaining any legal documents 
there. Even those who have papers from Myanmar face 
bureaucratic and financial hindrances in Thailand. 
Thai IDs are expensive (around 10,000 Baht according 
to a male Shan, Koung Jor, July 2016), and this is why 
many migrants and refugees prefer to get by without 
them. Especially those with the same ethnic, religious 
and linguistic background manage to blend in. Still,  
access to health services, formal employment, housing 
and land in Thailand often remains limited. As one  
refugee noted, “even with the 10-year ID, permissions 
are limited. Like [you can only rent the house, [but] 
can’t buy or build your own house. You can only buy [a] 
motorbike, not [a] car. As I have already decided that I 
will stay here, I need to get the opportunity to own a 
house and other things that I need. If I get a Thai ID, I 
also will try to acquire assets for the future of my son” 
(interview with Karen refugee, July 2016 Mae Sot). 
Without the proper documents, movement is restricted. 
Police checkpoints at entry points of provincial capitals 
as along the borders of provinces adjacent to Myanmar 
(e.g. Mae Sot, Ranong) are common and target especially 
non-nationals (personal observations August 2016). 
Access to social and political inclusion 
Refugees and migrants experience that bureau-
cratic hurdles from the Thai side and the level of wel-
come to newcomers depend much more on the per-
ceived strain on resources and the current demand of 
labour than on documents. Some feel that discrimi-
nation has decreased in general and the reputation of 
Burmese displaced people has improved over the last 
years: “In my view, the citizens of Thailand are […] 
changing their view toward the Burmese. I saw a lot 
of discrimination when I first arrived in Thailand […]. 
But now, they are becoming more aware of Burma 
than before as we are ASEAN countries. Thai media 
are also showing TV programmes about travelling to 
Burma, so there is less discrimination […]" (student at 
a migrant school, Chiang Mai, July 2017).
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Return and reintegration
Exclusion also plays a major role regarding return. 
In Myanmar, local communities are often not consulted 
when it comes to the return of IDPs and refugees.  
The Burmese government’s steps to facilitate return 
have reportedly often ignored the perceptions and 
needs of the local communities and future returnees: 
The government has, for example, built new buildings 
in remote areas, which were supposed to house  
returning DPs in the future. According to an advocacy 
group in Thailand, these projects were implemented 
without consulting local communities. What is more, 
there were rumours that other people than refugees 
have moved in (interview with Burmese activist, Mae 
Sot, July 2016). As a result, people did not return. The 
same happened to a return programme of an INGO.  
It reportedly had conferred with the government and 
armed groups but not with the refugees themselves: 
“They told us we have houses for you—but they had 
not consulted us before,” a community leader justi-
fied his refusal to follow the invitation of an INGO to 
return to Myanmar (Chiang Mai area, July 2016).
Furthermore, Burmese refugees fear discrimina-
tion in case of their future return. Those who stayed 
behind see refugees as “[…] lazy, reliant on other people, 
uneducated and think that refugees cannot work like 
them. So, there will be some discord among refugees 
and local people in Myanmar” (focus group interview 
with young refugees, Nu Po Camp). Another Karen 
college student stated: “If we go back to Myanmar, we 
will surely face discrimination among local people. 
Currently, some people from my village […] think  
refugees are bad peo-ple because refugees have  
betrayed the country. So that there are wars because 
of refugees. We are rebels and they stare at us as if we 
were bad men” (focus group discussion with Karen 
junior college students, Umpiem Camp, July 2016). 
Karen interviewees in Thailand also mentioned 
their fear of racial and religious discrimination by  
local communities when imagining their possible  
return to Myanmar (interview with female Karen  
office worker, Mae Sot, September 2016). Religion was 
considered a leading obstacle to any repatriation pro-
cess, since it is feared that returnees with a different 
religion will not be accepted in certain villages in  
Another example is that of the Shan. Similarities 
of language and religion have been fostering integra-
tion into the host communities to a certain degree. 
Thai who live in the border area—including some  
police and military personnel—understand or even 
speak Shan. The refugee children usually attend the 
Thai school in the village and thus speak Shan and 
Thai (Focus group interview with three Shan women, 
Koung Jor, July 2016). Generally, the children in 
Koung Jor Camp go to Chiang Mai or Bangkok to look 
for work. Others work for (local Thai) Shan people in 
the nearby village. Shan refugees integrated into the 
Thai labour market from the very start as migrants or 
undocumented workers because they were not allowed 
to enter the official temporary shelters on the border. 
It also helped in regard to integration that the refugees 
have been able to leave for work and school as they 
please and that local villagers have been able to enter 
the camp and hire workers.
The relations between host and refugee (be it liv-
ing together or be it living apart), in sum, are generally 
good. But there are cleavages within the refugee com-
munity in Thailand. Displaced persons described  
various tensions between Bamar and ethnic minori-
ties. A 54-year old Burmese former political activist 
stated: “If you speak Burmese, no one trusts you in 
the camp [...]. This is the hatred that the ethnic mi-
nority/groups has/have towards the Burmese govern-
ment and because of this, speaking Burmese and being 
Burmese [Bamar] is very hard for me in the camp, but 
I don’t think I can say that this is discrimination.  
After a while, I’m a teacher, people started to recognize 
me and know me as a teacher. It’s tough being a  
Burmese [Bamar] and living among the ethnic 
groups especially those who were forced to flee for 
political reasons” (interview with 54-year old Burmese, 
South Dagon, July 2017).27  
tive consequences of the rural exodus resulting in a shortage of labour  
supply in an ageing Thai society.
27 \  The fact that Burmese students that had been active in the pro- 
democracy uprising of 1988 were accepted by UNHCR as people of concern 
and enjoyed special protection at Maneeloy safe camp might have  
fostered resentment among ethnic minority groups even more. Bamar 
refugees were said to receive preferential treatment in terms of asylum 
options and opportunities to resettle overseas (South, 2013, p. 189)
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want to go back. This shows that many DPs are well 
aware of the rights, restrictions and opportunities—
access to aid, resettlement, work, etc.—that are con-
nected to different statuses. However, others com-
pletely lack such information. The cautious approach 
to return is also related to the fact that it becomes 
more difficult to re-register as a refugee. The primary 
lesson DPs have learnt after multiple displacements 
is that you have to widen your options and be prepared 
for any eventuality.
Mobility and translocality
On the backdrop of substantial obstacles to local 
integration in Thailand and to reintegration in  
Myanmar, trans-local livelihoods, movement back 
and forth, as well as partial return movements, have 
evolved as coping strategies. DPs strive after a variety 
of alternative options available. Burmese from the  
periphery have always crossed the border to search 
for job opportunities, for economic and social purposes, 
to flee persecution and violent conflict and to find 
better healthcare and education. For a long time, the 
border between Myanmar and Thailand has been less 
of a dividing line than a resource in the everyday 
practices of those communities and is still highly  
porous. The passing via motorboat over the green  
border without any passport or visa control is easy. In 
Mae Sot, for example, boats cross the Mo River every 
minute in peak times to bring people and goods from 
one side to the other. Better-off Burmese cross the 
border for one-day shopping trips from Yangon. 
Burmese children attend migrant schools or 
camp schools across the border or stay in boarding 
schools and go back to their families in Myanmar  
in the summer break. A considerable number of the 
students we talked to in the camps, in migrant 
schools and also at a KNU school we visited, came to 
Thailand by themselves and stay there with relatives 
or in the mentioned boarding houses (focus group 
discussion, Mae La, July 2016). These boarding houses 
have come to be important access points for education. 
The downside of sending unaccompanied children is 
that it often increases the children’s vulnerability as 
those who look after them have different motivations 
and agendas. But it is not only pupils who travel back 
Karen state (focus group discussion with Karen junior 
college students, Umpiem Mai Camp, July 2016). Yet, 
as one representative of Committee for Internally 
Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) stated, the relation-
ship with the communities at the place of return is 
usually good, since most return to their home villages. 
“Only very few have to locally integrate into a new  
environment, but those usually experience sympathy” 
(Mae Sot, July 2016).
Besides those fears, everyday trials of a seemingly 
less problematic nature play an important role. “I did 
not know where to go, I did not know anybody or any-
thing about the place”, a young refugee recounted his 
visit in his parent’s village of origin in Myanmar 
(Mae Sot, August 2016). Many other refugees who were 
either born or raised in exile recounted similar expe-
riences about different behaviours, different ways of 
relating socially, different living standards on the 
other side of the border. Their so-called social capital 
and their networks in Myanmar are therefore small. 
There are also different perceptions and related ex-
pectations of life in exile: Those who stayed feel that 
they have suffered and endured more than those who 
allegedly abandoned their homes while the refugees 
feel that they are the ones who have endured more. 
Practically this means that returnees often struggle 
to get the support from the village of origin they  
expected and vice versa (Chiang Mai, July/ September 
2016). 
Many displaced Burmese DPs are well aware of 
the obstacles to return with regard to persisting con-
flict in Myanmar and a lack of livelihood opportuni-
ties. Therefore, return is one but not necessarily the 
favoured option for them: “We are only guests here 
[in Thailand] and have to go whenever asked to”, a  
Karenni representative explained, “but we cannot go 
now. Maybe in 30 years”. When asked about the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of being a camp resident 
compared to a legal work migrant, the same person 
answered: “We cannot turn into migrants, because 
they can be sent back whenever their permit is expired” 
(Ban Mai Nai Soi, August 2016). What the representative 
pointed out was the principle of non-refoulement, 
the option respectively the right to remain in the 
host country as long as refugees do not voluntarily 
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resources, networks, skills and various other factors. 
The case of a college student who recently returned 
to Hpa’an is paradigmatic: He used to study in Thai 
border camps but decided to stay in Burma for good. 
But he still kept his UNHCR card (interview with 19-
year old Karen college student, Hpa’an, Myanmar, 
September 2017). DPs have experienced that it is vital 
to maintain multiple access points to healthcare, 
food, job markets, education or resettlement oppor-
tunities, etc.  
Family and community split-ups are an important 
coping strategy during displacement. In some cases, 
the men who were bound to work for one of the 
armed actors stayed behind, while the women and 
children were able to flee. The men would eventually 
follow later. The pattern of family split-ups is illustrated 
by the case of a 63-year old Karen woman in Mae La 
Camp. She fled in 2009, came with one daughter, one 
son and three nephews, while her other daughter 
stayed in Karen state, where she cultivates the family’s 
land. She gets permission to visit her daughter in  
Myanmar every two years for one month. Her other 
daughter works in the camp hospital, her son with an 
INGO, her nephews attend a camp school. She is the 
only one who would like to return (interview with  
female Karen refugee, Mae La Camp, July 2016). 
The question of who flees with whom largely  
depends on external circumstances: In the case of 
the Koung Jor community, for example, the entire  
village was able to flee and find refuge collectively. Yet 
people do not necessarily always flee with relatives, 
but often join their peer group. Security risks—such 
as many checkpoints—force people to split up regard-
less of such preferences (KRC representative, Mae Sot, 
July 2016). Some of the interviewed families split up 
deliberately. One part of the family stayed to continue 
cultivating the family’s land. Those and other trans-
local networks are maintained through remittances. 
A survey from 2012 of 204 Burmese workers in Thai-
land showed that it is quite frequent to support family 
members that have stayed in Myanmar: 66.7 per cent 
of all respondents (Burman 41.1%, Mon 31.9%, Karen 
 13.7%, Shan 7.4%, Rakhine 2%, Rohingya 1%) sent back 
more than 10,000 Baht annually (Chantavanich & 
Vungsiriphisal, 2012, p. 268). 
and forth. It is quite common that those in the camps 
regularly travel back to their communities of origin 
to meet their relatives and to bring in the harvest. 
These trips also help to defend possible property rights 
back in Myanmar and to stay informed about the sit-
uation back home. Such trips also clearly illustrate 
that—despite confinement policies and precarious 
living conditions—there are close linkages between 
both sides of the Thai‒Burmese borderland (Lee, 2012b).
However, the option of movement is not the same 
for all displaced persons. Besides those who cannot 
afford to travel or those that are hindered by security 
constraints, age or health problems, political activists 
who have not been resettled to a third country are 
quite restricted with regard to visits or financial  
remittances. They often fear difficulties with the  
Burmese authorities and explicitly ask their exiled 
relatives not to come back (interview with KRC repre-
sentative, Mae Sot, July 2016). Then there are those 
who have already returned to Myanmar, but refrain 
from repatriating to their village of origin: “They are 
scared of me because they don’t want to be in trouble 
because of me and I don’t want to give them trouble 
and put them in danger, too” (interview with 54-year 
old Burmese former political activist from Taungoo, 
now returnee from Mae La Camp Thailand, South  
Dagon, July 2017).
Motives for movements are, in sum, complex. 
Rather than finding neatly separated realities of  
refuge and return, our study revealed a high level of 
interwoven in-between layers. Trans-locality and  
cyclical return movements are much more significant 
than permanent return or facilitated repatriation.28 
This holds true for migrant workers and the camp 
population. Displaced persons have developed a wide 
array of coping strategies depending on available  
28 \  Some stressed their wish to stay independent in their decision to re-
turn: “I heard bad news about those who return … That’s why I return 
on my own. If I come back with a repatriation  
programme, there will be a lot of procedures and restrictions that we 
are required to follow. They will give us money, but there will be moni-
toring and evaluation and that undermines my freedom […]. I want to 
be a free person who abides by nothing […]. People will call you to  
evaluate you […]. I don’t like to be controlled. If the government could 
provide assistance—financially and a mental health programme—for 
those who return, this would be good. But now, they are asking too 
many questions and our freedom will be undermined […]”. Recently 
intensified battles and the low trust in the peace process make this 
assessment appear sound.
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dangerous and demeaning (3D) jobs and established 
their businesses are still in a tenuous position due to 
their volatile legal status. Crackdowns are frequent 
and force some to return. Those who return rarely 
stay for good but rather go back temporarily. Many 
cases encountered in Thailand featured regular pen-
dulum movements: A common pattern encountered 
was that Burmese refu-gees who went to Myanmar  
to do construction work and who then came back to 
restart their business in Thailand (interviews with 
several Shan in Chiang Mai, December 2016). 
In consequence, an ethno-economic division of 
work has been established in many parts along the 
border. The migrant economy on the border enables 
people to run micro-businesses (e.g. minibus services, 
internet cafés, tea shops, etc.). The western part of 
Mae Sot, for example, is primarily run by Burmese. 
Muslims from Myanmar dominate the import and 
export of vehicles of all kinds, Burmese Chinese dom-
inate the warehouses. Those who have stayed the 
longest rent out shops and apartments to those who 
have arrived later. The daily commuters provide the 
goods; their profit margin is reflected in the height of 
the bribe they have to pay to the vigorously con-
trolling Thai police. The networks extend all the way 
to Mahachai, a town on the outskirts of Bangkok: 
From fruits to textiles to money transfers “all is con-
nected to Myanmar—and you will find everything 
you would find in Yangon, too” (migrant worker, Mae 
Sot, August 2017).
These cases show that refugees weigh the risks  
of return in comparison to their current situation. 
Decisive factors concern security, access to legal  
documents, public services and infrastructure.29  The 
lack of infrastructure is directly related to security 
concerns: “We are still afraid of the Burmese military. 
If war comes again, how should we ask for help, com-
municate and spread the news to the media without 
phone or Internet […]. Our land and regions are not  
 
29 \  In a focus group discussion with college students in Nu Po Camp in 
July 2016, the following concerns were raised: “If we go back, we don't 
have cash to go to hospital […]. Do we have to be refugees again to  
return to Thailand?” […] “We don't have a Burmese ID and some refugees 
lost or burned it during the war in their villages. Without ID, we will 
probably face difficulties in travelling to other regions”.
This Working Paper analyzed the main challenges 
that displaced persons from Myanmar face and  
the coping strategies that they develop as a reaction 
to these challenges. A transnational approach that 
stretched beyond legal categorizations revealed paral-
lels and differences in the trajectories of refugees, 
IDPs and migrants affected by protracted displace-
ment in Myanmar and Thailand. The research team 
analyzed these similarities and disparities with  
regard to protection, livelihoods, access to land,  
property, services, rights and questions of social  
inclusion. An analysis of the perspectives, trajectories 
and strategies of displaced persons themselves indi-
cates that there needs to be a broader understanding 
of durable solutions for protracted displacement.  
Beyond the three classical legal–normative solutions 
(return, local integration and resettlement) DPs 
found a wide array of coping strategies that are situated 
in-between or beyond those solutions. When scruti-
nizing the reliance on humanitarian assistance, we 
discovered a diversification of livelihood strategies 
within camps. Beyond aid-related strategies, we also 
observed (cyclical) return movements and the estab-
lishment of translocal networks; we also found the 
establishment and institutionalization of self-organ-
ized infrastructure to be vital coping mechanisms. 
Return and local integration (and probably resettle-
ment) should thus neither be considered an exhaustive 
list of alternatives nor be regarded as completely  
unconnected approaches. They are rather two options 
in a continuum of strategies comprising cyclical and 
temporary return processes, transnational networks 
and patterns of de facto local integration.
The role of risk-benefit considerations 
for agency
Our research in Thailand and Myanmar showed 
that the legal status of people is not necessarily pre-
determined: A person might shift from one status to  
another or hold different legal statuses simultane-
ously. It also became evident how these legal catego-
rizations frame individual coping options. Those in 
Thailand, who have successfully escaped dirty, 
Conclusion
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It seems evident that it makes sense to work with 
categories that go beyond the status attributed to indi-
viduals based on their final or temporary destination, 
particularly in the Thai context in which refugees in 
the strict legal terminology do not exist at all. As legal- 
normative categories are blurred both in time and 
space, we thus argue that it is somewhat counterpro-
ductive for descriptive studies (probably also for  
humanitarian interventions and development aid) to 
stick to them (cf. Horstmann, 2015; Sadan, 2013). 
Relation of time in exile and prospects 
of return
The international community, the Thai as the  
Myanmar government seem to agree that the time 
has come for refugees, illegal migrants and IDPs to  
return. Most humanitarian actors are compliant with 
this policy: They are reducing assistance for camps 
(in Thailand and Myanmar) and promote return. 
However, IDPs, migrants as well as refugees weigh 
their options to either stay or to return carefully. 
Their assessments are not necessarily in line with 
the official policy. The factors that influence the  
decision vary: Refugees as migrants in Thailand are 
very concerned about their regulated status; IDPs in 
Myanmar worry more about concrete security risks 
such as fighting, the presence of armed actors and 
landmines. The decision also depends on the individual 
context: Benefits and risks are always evaluated  
according to the nature of experiences and the hard-
ships that the respective DPs have gone through. 
Those who have fled conflict and repression often 
stressed that they would not return until the conflicts 
have been settled. Those who, in contrast, have fled 
the indirect consequences of conflict such as poverty 
or have left preventively would be more likely to go 
back if there were a public infrastructure and indi-
vidual opportunities. Even though the weight of  
factors varies, livelihoods, peace and security, regulated 
availability of land and housing, access to health  
services and education, marginalization and discrim-
ination by the authorities and conflict with local 
communities are crucial for the decision of all 
developed yet for travelling, like roads and bridges; 
we worry that if something happens that we need to 
go to town or the countryside or the Thai–Burmese 
border in an emergency, it will be very difficult to 
travel” (focus group discussion, Umpiem Mai Camp, 
July 2106). Furthermore, decreasing prospects of re-
settlement, the general uncertainty about the future 
of the camps, fear of forced return and the discrimi-
nation at a place that is not home influence the tra-
jectories of DPs. “Integration is a European idea”, 
many correspondents stated, indicating that they 
have to develop other options based on a more diver-
sified tactic in the long run.30  
Our research has shown that any dichotomy that 
contrasts non-refugees as masters of their fate with 
displaced persons as victims without agency is obso-
lete. The coping patterns of displaced persons are 
highly flexible and adaptive. Conditions for pursuing 
certain strategies differ considerably for the Shan,  
Rohingya, Karen and Kachin and within those groups 
themselves. But if circumstances require or allow it, 
IDPs might become refugees, refugees might become 
internally displaced while trying to reintegrate, and 
refugees frequently leave the temporary shelters to 
become illegal migrant workers or to obtain official 
migrant worker status. This list is by no means ex-
haustive, and the options are not mutually exclusive. 
We found persons who were immobilized in conflict 
zones, educational migrants in camps, people who 
had fled violence and conflict who have not registered 
in camps and a variety of other patterns: Some  
displaced persons have applied for migrant status 
instead of applying for asylum. Others live and work 
as illegal migrants. 
30 \  According to a representative of the Committee of Internally  
Displaced Karen People (CIDKP), 70 to 80 per cent of the IDPs in Kayin 
State have returned. The majority of these former IDPs would go to 
their place of origin, while some, especially those who do not own  
land, go to the newly built settlement sites, which are financed by the 
government and built by KNU. Reportedly, there is also a generational 
difference. While the elderly usually want to return to their home  
villages, the younger ones prefer relocation sites. The better educated 
ones—in contrast—would prefer to move to the cities or to be resettled 
in a third country (Mae Sot, July 2016).
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Displaced persons’ preference for 
mixed solution strategies
Local actors, in contrast to the coalition of gov-
ernments and international NGOs mentioned above, 
see and seek alternative options to return. They are 
aware of the risks connected to a return to Myanmar 
and of giving up the status and the respective special 
protection as a refugee and the option for resettlement. 
The experience of multiple displacements and  
protracted conflict have led to a diversifications of 
livelihoods (e.g. farming, gardening, day labour), in-
come sources (e.g. work, aid, remittances), residences 
(e.g. rural, urban, bi-national), poly-local households 
(split-up of family members), entitlements (right to 
stay, resettle, return, compensation, option of work 
permit or amnesty in Thailand). Those strategies 
have not always made people less vulnerable. In 
some cases—for trafficked persons for instance— 
exploitation and insecurity even increase. But the 
bottom line is that those strategies define the agency 
on which any durable solution strategy of interna-
tional actors has to build on. 
Aid that builds upon this agency should be more 
likely to be sustainable because merely existing resil-
ience is fostered rather than built-up from scratch. 
Even though this seems paradoxical in times of 
democratization and peacebuilding, existing coping 
mechanism are in a moment of crisis in Myanmar.  
Increasing difficulties in finding safe refuge over the 
border are amplified by more unstable front lines and 
ever-changing alliances respectively fallouts of armed 
actors: IDPs have to react to fights among the different 
armed groups. Those fights, unlike before, have started 
to foster ethnic tensions amongst the civilians. In  
addition, forced recruitment into these groups has 
been increasing. While the causes to flee have thus 
multiplied, options of refuge have diminished. 
We have shown that DPs have developed a wider 
range of mixed strategies in response—parts of the 
family are sent to safe havens while others remain in 
high-risk areas. Livelihood activities that turned in-
sufficient due to the violent conflict were comple-
mented with labour activities, seasonal national and 
international migration. Refugees in camps resorted 
displaced persons to eventually return. The choice, 
therefore, depends mainly on the amount and quality 
of knowledge people have of the political situation, 
the political transition process and ceasefire negotia-
tions in Myanmar. 
Different experiences lead to varying perceptions 
and, for example, generational differences: Older  
persons who have experienced many displacements 
(sometimes stretching back to the Japanese invasion) 
are more sceptical about return than younger ones 
(who usually have not experienced as many traumatic 
events). The latter are described as more hopeful and 
more willing to return—even to a place different 
from their place of origin (local expert and activist, 
Mae Sot, September 2016). As described above, education 
is a decisive factor in this regard: Children are sent 
(often on their own) to benefit from migrant schools 
on the other side of the border. Responsibilities  
towards younger relatives who attend school in the 
camps, in turn, play a role in deciding whether to  
return or not for camp residents (interview with  
Karen male refugee, Nu Po camp, July 2016). Finally, 
the time in exile and the number of contacts to the 
area of origin is of utmost importance for movement 
dynamics.
The more bridges were burnt during displacement, 
the less likely people are prepared to go back. The  
existence of social networks, contacts with relatives or 
friends in Myanmar have been positively related to 
the likelihood of return. Many displaced persons travel 
to their community of origin on a regular basis and 
are thus able to maintain these networks. Through 
these networks, many displaced persons gain insights 
into the livelihood and security situation in their 
communities of origin. But there is quite a large number 
of refugees who have not had this opportunity. They 
rely on their village or community leader: “Some  
[returnees] will go back to their families. Others who 
have no land [back in Myanmar] will go where their 
leaders will send them. The village and district leaders 
still have authority, and people will go where they 
send them” (Interview with KRC representative, Mae 
Sot, 23 July 2017). Many organizations that are working 
in the camps have confirmed the crucial role of the 
leaders and their vertical line of command in tightly 
knit communities in this regard. 
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seasonal workers. However, diversification is not by 
definition beneficiary for DPs. The desperate situation 
opens the door for abuses and exploitative practices 
by employers and authorities (Brees, 2008; Marschke 
& Vandergeest, 2016)—including cases of trafficking, 
especially of female victims (Beyrer, 2001; Thomas & 
Jones, 1993; Young, Pyne, Quick, & McKenna, 2006).
Outlook: Can expectations and  
practices be reconciled? 
While the latest democratization achievements 
in Myanmar seem impressive, they also expose  
significant flaws: Key ministries like the Ministry of 
the Interior and Border Affairs, or the Ministry of  
Defence and a veto fraction of parliament are still  
reserved for the military. The transition is struggling 
with the constitution of 2008, which legitimizes 
these residues. The official beginning of democracy 
did not coincide with the disappearance of violent 
conflict and displacement in Myanmar, despite many 
unquestionable advances. Contrary to expectations of 
the international community, armed clashes between 
the army and ethnic armed groups persist in many 
parts of the country. They even intensified in October 
2016—especially in Kachin and Shan States (Myanmar 
Humanitarian Country Team, 2017). Also in Karen 
State, violations of the NCA and clashes between the 
Tatmadaw and EAGs have been reported and lead to 
new displacements. Furthermore, some of the coun-
try’s most important armed actors remained outside 
the ceasefire process and have formed a new alliance 
of ethnic militias (Northern Alliance-Burma). Moreover, 
various splinter groups and new actors evolved. 
The split-up of ethnic armed groups causes further 
recruitment, fights and displacement. Other EAGs like 
the Wa-State army—which is the most influential 
armed group by now and not yet cut off from Chinese 
support—remain in control of autonomous regions. 
Much of this is related to the drugs trade and illicit  
activities of influential cartels, which are sometimes 
hard to distinguish from a land grabbing and resources 
appropriating army and its cronies. 
to their fields across the border to compensate dimin-
ished food rations. Numerous IDPs found temporary 
shelter arrangements in camps, temple compounds 
or with hosts. Some IDPs are still near their houses 
and fields, some with, others without access to them. 
Many are confined in areas with very limited oppor-
tunities to make a living (e.g. Rohingya), while others 
are in areas where their labour force is highly sought 
after. 
These types are again not clearly distinguishable 
and often interrelated. Although empirically relevant, 
little is known about movements in the context of a 
protracted conflict that do not necessarily fall under 
the binary refugee/ IDP radar. Specifically immobility—
the fact that armed groups force communities to stay 
in a restricted area—and seasonal internal labour  
migration are often not sufficiently correlated with 
armed conflict. This is illustrated by the following 
case: An orphan in Northern Shan State, whose father 
was killed after having been drafted in his stead,  
reported that he had to stay in this high-risk area to 
access his land. He explained that he was hiding in 
the nearby forest during the night and was working 
the fields during the day. Yet this has not been sufficient 
to cover his family’s expenditures. As the father is 
gone, the first-born son has to make up the missing 
income. To sustain his sister and brother, he has to 
earn extra money. His strategy was to migrate as a 
seasonal worker into an even more war-stricken area: 
The mining sector in Kachin. “We do not have a choice”, 
he explained (interview, Lashio, September 2017). 
More investigations into such cases—that are not 
on the radar of most aid organizations—are needed to 
better understand and distinguish causes, form and 
long-term impact of violent conflict. We have demon-
strated that—due to the loss of assets, dwindling 
funds, lack of access to former livelihoods—DPs  
usually have to look for additional income opportuni-
ties. In consequence, they have been diversifying—in 
reaction to the challenges they encountered—their 
range and scope of work. Many families have mem-
bers in other parts of the country or other countries 
and are working and living there permanently or as 
THE STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH DISPLACEMENT IN MYANMAR AND THAILAND \ M. RUDOLF & C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE  
33 \ \ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2018
The 40 per cent of the workforce in the fishing indus-
try and 50 per cent of the domestic jobs done by  
Burmese are the most prominent (Mon, 2010). Besides 
that, they are also found in garment production, sales, 
street stalls, restaurants, wholesale, retail trade and 
vendor- and husbandry-related work (Chantavanich 
& Vungsiriphisal, 2012, p. 252). 
In sum, while Burmese workers are discriminated 
against and exploited, there is a strong dependence of 
local economies on the Burmese labour force, especially 
in the agricultural and manufacturing sector. Both 
trends have existed alongside for decades. Rather than 
seeing the potential synergies if both were related, e.g. 
by building upon the language skills, work experience 
and intercultural capacities of displaced persons from 
Myanmar, both issues are seen as unrelated, even  
exacerbating the problem posed by their presence in 
Thailand. 
Therefore, it is not surprising, that the Thai gov-
ernment and the international community—despite 
persisting conflicts and enduring challenges for  
return in Myanmar—are planning the closure of the 
temporary shelters in Thailand and the return of large 
parts of the in-camp population to Myanmar. However, 
it is expected that a residual population (est. 20,000) 
will remain and require services. It remains to be seen 
whether the Rohingya crisis will reverse the fading- 
out of aid for IDPs. The leading question of this Paper 
was whether the change of governance eradicated the 
causes of displacement, brought peace and laid the 
foundation for return. According to the cases presented, 
such assumptions have proven to be wrong in many 
ways. 
Looking at the level of access to legal, economic, 
political rights, services, to housing, land, property 
and livelihoods, the situation on the ground remains 
dire. To halt displacement and find durable solutions, 
these issues need to be addressed in a way that shows 
immediate and graspable effects on the micro level.
Rakhine state violence made headlines in 2017, 
and the offensive of the army has been stepped up in 
various zones in border regions since the end of 2016.31 
The situation in Myanmar is, in sum, very diverse 
and regionally often completely different, if not  
contradictory. On the one hand, transition made the 
daily lives of a significant number of people more 
peaceful. Yet, on the other hand, forced displacement 
due to industrialization, violence by armed actors and 
land grabbing has increased in a good number of 
places. Those conflicts seem likely to increase and 
cause new waves of displacement in the short and 
mid-term future. 
Against this backdrop of ongoing fighting and 
mass displacement, it is somewhat improbable that 
large-scale and sustainable return processes of ethnic 
minorities will take place. It is more likely that only 
the encamped populations will take advantage of  
assisted return, and it remains to be seen whether 
this return is permanent and sustainable or whether 
people—especially the younger generations—will 
find their way back to Thailand or elsewhere. 
This means that seasonal and permanent migra-
tion to Thailand, triggered and boosted by displacement, 
seems to be there to stay. In the construction, hotel 
and agricultural sector—and in jobs that are dirty, 
dangerous and demeaning (3D)—the role of Burmese 
in Thailand is crucial. Surveys on migrants and their 
impact on the economy of Thailand vary greatly. Some 
claim that out of 1.2 million migrants from Myanmar 
in Thailand, only 620,000 have a regular (legal) status 
and 570,000 an irregular status (Chantavanich & 
Vungsiriphisal, 2012, p. 260). Others put the numbers 
with three million illegal and two million legal workers 
from Myanmar much higher (Herman, 2016). Large 
parts of the industry and service sector rely, without 
doubt, on Myanmar workers—estimates speak of six 
per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in general.
 
31 \  Conflict also persists in Rakhine State between the Muslim minority 
and ethnic Rakhine. It escalated after attacks on Myanmar’s border 
posts in October 2016 that were ascribed to an Islamist movement 
among the Rohingya. In the summer of 2017, after an attack on police 
and army posts, the situation further escalated in such a way that 
thousands of people were displaced. On 17 December 2017, the UN  
Children’s Fund reported that 655,000 new refugees had arrived in 
Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 (UNICEF, 2017).
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fears of involuntary return, we consistently empha-
sized the fact that our academic research is inde-
pendent. Handling expectations of the interviewees 
posed another challenge to the research, which was 
confronted by maximal transparency and clarity 
about the scientific character of the research project, 
its aims and limitations.
Research sites
In Thailand, the research took place in Bangkok, 
Bankrut, Chiang Mai, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot, Mae 
Hong Son, Mai Chai and Ranong, including five  
different camp sites (Koung Jor, Umpiem Mai, Nu Po, 
Mae La and Ban Nai Soi). The sites were chosen  
according to the prevalence of the ethnic communi-
ties from Myanmar that were historically significantly 
affected by displacement and mostly sought refuge in 
Thailand. In Myanmar, we did our research in Yangon 
and its outskirts, Kachin State (Bahmo, Momauk, 
Dawawbya, Pakkagom), Northern Shan state (Lashio, 
Namlok, Theinni, San Phyat, Par Sar, Pan Thad), Rakhine 
State (Sittwe, Kyauktaw, Yei Thai, Raw Ma Ni, Pa Rein, 
Mrauk-U, Paungdok, St Twe, Thetkalpyen, Taw Gyi, 
Min Gyan, Nget Chaung, Nyaungshwe) as well as in 
Mon and Karen State (Mawlamyine, Hpa-An, Kawkareik, 
Mu Aye Pu, Ei Tu Hta, U Wee Klo).
The most displaced people can be found in those 
border regions on the periphery. There are various IDP 
camps in the border areas—some in, others outside 
government-controlled areas, the team visited both 
during the research. Many are only set up for a very 
short time, others have existed for years. The camps 
mostly consist of makeshift wooden structures as no 
permanent buildings are allowed. International NGOs 
provide food and non-food items. Thai authorities con-
trol access. The camp residents mostly organize educa-
tion and administration. As monasteries and churches 
are the refugees’ first choice for fleeing violent con-
flicts, many camps are located on church compounds. 
Research in Myanmar included neighbourhoods 
that have been the site of displacement, confined 
neighbourhoods of persons threatened by displacement 
Indicators and limitations 
To assess de facto local integration and condi-
tions for sustainable (re-)integration, this Working  
Paper extended Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risk and 
Reconstruction (IRR) Model (2000), which delineates 
eight risk factors that come with displacement. The 
model offers clear indicators for measuring impover-
ishment and reintegration focusing on social and 
economic components such as access to land, em-
ployment, shelter, food, healthcare, education, social 
inclusion, the restoration of common property and 
services and social capital. Kälin & Schrepfer’s (2012) 
adaptation of the model adds to the list of risks lead-
ing to impoverishment as well as to the processes 
needed to reverse or mitigate them. For our research, 
we included the following indicators to also be able 
to assess social, economic, political and legal (re)inte-
gration: Access to legal representation and law  
enforcement; access to political recognition and  
representation; holding of valid documents, titles; 
and empowered awareness of human (women’s,  
children’s) rights.  
In Thailand and Myanmar, the accessibility of 
camps represented a significant obstacle. Entry  
permits to the shelters need to be requested from the 
Ministry for the Interior (MOI) several weeks in  
advance. Although we were able to obtain camp passes 
for two camps, we were not always able to choose  
interview partners ourselves or to move freely within 
the area. Even though access is strictly controlled in 
Myanmar, security personnel only escorted us in one 
site. We were generally able to discuss issues privately—
thanks to extended visits and more meetings outside 
formal settings: e.g. accompanying the interview 
partners to their home or work place. Many of the 
younger interview partners who were educated in the 
temporary shelters had considerable English skills, 
but interpretation from the different vernaculars to 
English was often necessary. 
Other concerns related to trauma sensibility in a 
setting that is shaped by violent conflict, atrocities 
and grave human rights abuses. To avoid increasing 
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and those quarters where IDPs have been resettled—
all in urban areas like Sittwe or Bahmo. The camps 
range from makeshift wooden shacks in the tidal 
swamps of Rhakine’s coast, prison-like tent towns 
close to Sittwe, wooden long huts in Kachin, where 
dozens of families are cramped into a few square  
metres to settlements in the countryside in Karen 
State that have the appearance of average villages. Also, 
visits to political parties, newspapers, schools, learning 
spaces for minors, migrant schools, youth clubs, mili-
tary camps, cultural festivals and the like were an  
elementary part of the research. 
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